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Law and Power in Health Care: Challenges to
Physician Control
MARY ANNE BOBINSKI†
I. INTRODUCTION
It was an honor to participate in the Baldy Center for
Law & Social Policy’s Fortieth Anniversary Conference. The
Baldy Center has provided a home for countless scholars and
students interested in studying the law as both an
intellectual discipline and as a force shaping our lives. The
Center fosters interdisciplinary dialogue that has helped us
to understand law’s theoretical underpinnings and its real-

† Dean, Emory University School of Law. Completion of this article was greatly
aided by research support I received while serving as Professor, Allard School of
Law (ALS), University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC Canada. Thanks to
ALS students Chris Lee and Coco Wiens-Paris for research assistance. Special
thanks to SUNY Distinguished Professor Errol E. Meidinger as well as to the
other organizers and participants in Tempering Power, The Baldy Center’s 40th
Anniversary Conference, November 10, 2018 for their thoughtful comments and
the many provocative insights found in the Conference presentations and papers.
This article is part of a larger comparative research project considering the
characterization of the physician-patient relationship in the United States,
Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. I therefore wish to acknowledge
with gratitude the support I received while serving as a visiting scholar at the
Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at
Harvard Law School, the University of Sydney Law School, the Melbourne Law
School and the Faculty of Law at Oxford University. At Oxford University, I also
benefited from the collegial advice and support provided through a Plumer
Visiting Research Fellowship at St. Anne’s College.
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world impact. Thanks to the Center’s efforts, we have been
allowed to see more clearly the limits of law, the impact of
law on people, and the successes and failures of the efforts of
individuals and organizations to change the law to serve
their own purposes.1 Moreover, the Baldy Center’s ambitious
vision includes the promotion of global engagement through
faculty research projects and visitor programs for scholars
from around the world. Here too, one can see the impact of
the Baldy Center’s support on virtually every continent.
Professor John Braithwaite’s Mitchell Lecture on Tempered
Power, Variegated Capitalism, Law & Society reflects the
Baldy’s Center’s vision and mission. Professor Braithwaite is
well-recognized as one of the world’s leading scholars on
topics such as peacebuilding, restorative justice, criminology
and responsive regulation.2
Many of the papers presented at this year’s Baldy
Conference reflect Professor Braithwaite’s nuanced and
thoughtful consideration of significant global developments,
such as the rise of authoritarian capitalism and challenges
to the neoliberal democratic state. This Article resonates
with Professor Braithwaite’s calls to appreciate the role of
law in tempering power and to consider carefully the
conflicts and complexities below the surface of our facile
1. John Braithwaite, Tempered Power, Variegated Capitalism, Law and
Society, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 527 (2019); Susan Bibler Coutin, ‘Otro Mundo Es
Posible’: Tempering the Power of Immigration Law through Activism, Advocacy,
and Action, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 653 (2019); Heinz Klug, Transformative
Constitutions and the Role of Integrity Institutions in Tempering Power: The Case
of Resistance to State Capture in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 67 BUFF. L. REV.
701 (2019); Martin Krygier, What’s the Point of the Rule of Law?, 67 BUFF. L. REV.
743 (2019); Kwai Hang Ng, Is China a “Rule-by-Law” Regime?, 67 BUFF. L. REV.
793 (2019); Nimer Sultany, What Good is Abstraction? From Liberal Legitimacy
to Social Justice, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 823 (2019); David A. Westbrook & Mark
Maguire, Those People [May Yet Be] a Kind of Solution” Late Imperial Thoughts
on the Humanization of Officialdom, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 889 (2019); Peer
Zumbansen, Transnational Law as Socio-Legal Theory and Critique: Prospects
for “Law and Society” in a Divided World, 67 Buff. L. Rev. 909 (2019).
2. For an overview of Professor Braithwaite’s scholarly work and public
engagement,
see
JOHN
BRAITHWAITE:
WAR,
CRIME,
REGULATION,
https://johnbraithwaite.com/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
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characterization of capitalist or non-capitalist economies, or
liberal democracies and authoritarian states. However, this
Article moves away from meta-theoretic, global concerns to
focus on the story of power within one segment of the
American economy—health care—and perhaps even more
narrowly, to the position of two groups of actors—physicians
and patients—within the health care sector.3
In this Article, I argue that law has played a major role
in creating and shifting the balance of power in health care
but that market forces have now displaced law in several
important respects. The Article explores whether the effort
to use law to affect power in health care should be affirmed
or abandoned. Part II of this Article describes the role of law
in establishing the power of physicians in health care. Part
III explores the fundamental importance of law in
empowering patients and a series of law-based challenges to
physician supremacy. In Part IV, I will turn to consider a key
issue in the role of law today: whether and how law can
successfully harness physicians’ power, knowledge, and
expertise to serve patients’ interests. In Part V, I offer some
concluding thoughts about the past and future role of law in
allocating power in the patient-physician relationship.
II. THE LAW AS A SOURCE OF PHYSICIAN CONTROL
A. Overview
It is commonplace today to think of law in opposition to

3. In 2016, there were nearly a million practicing physicians in the United
States. Aaron Young, et al., A Census of Actively Licensed Physicians in the
United States, 2016, 103 J. MED. REG. 7, 7 (2017) (the census counted actively
licensed allopathic and osteopathic physicians in the United States, serving a
population of 323 million). Professor Braithwaite is an influential scholar on
various health care law topics, including the regulation of pharmaceutical
companies and nursing homes. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, ET AL., REGULATING
AGED CARE: RITUALISM AND THE NEW PYRAMID (2007); GRAHAM DUKES, JOHN
BRAITHWAITE & J.P. MALONEY, PHARMACEUTICALS, CORPORATE CRIME AND PUBLIC
HEALTH (2014).
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medicine. There are countless jokes about the suspicion or
even hostility of physicians toward lawyers. Yet, law played
an important role in creating and solidifying the dominance
of the medical profession and it is law, in part, that allowed
physicians to control a significant portion of the health care
system in the United States in the period from the late 1800s
to the 1950s.
The story of the birth of the medical profession is
compellingly told by Paul Starr in his Pulitzer Prize winning
book, The Social Transformation of American Medicine.4
Professor Starr traces the history of medical practice in the
United States and identifies the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries as the time period in which the medical
profession “[rose] to sovereignty.”5 At various stages and in
4. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982)
[hereinafter STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION]. Dr. Starr is Professor of Sociology
and Public Affairs and Stuart Professor of Communications and Public Affairs at
Princeton University. He remains a thoughtful commentator on health care and
health care reform in the United States. See, e.g., Paul Starr, Rebounding with
Medicare: Reform and Counter-Reform in American Health Care, 43 J. HEALTH
POL., POL’Y & L. 707 (2018) (noting that major U.S. health reforms have been
achieved only after significant setbacks and arguing that the next reform effort
should focus on the expansion of Medicare to include persons fifty to sixty-four
years old).
Professor Starr’s views on the history of medicine have attracted both praise
and criticism, with some scholars contesting his emphasis on the role of
physicians, which at least implicitly and often explicitly deprivileges the roles of
other providers, patients, and economic or political actors. See, e.g., John Harley
Warner, Grand Narrative and Its Discontents: Medical History and the Social
Transformation of American Medicine, 29 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 757, 765
(2004). Yet Starr’s overview of the rise of the medical profession continues to
resonate. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Uses of the Social Transformation
of American Medicine: The Case of Law, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 799, 799
(2004) (noting that the book was “clearly the most cited single source in law
review articles dealing with health law.”).
5. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 4, at 4. Professor Starr argues
that “[t]he history of medicine has been written as an epic of progress, but it is
also a tale of social and economic conflict over the emergence of new hierarchies
of power and authority, new markets, and new conditions of belief and
experience. In America, no one group has held so dominant a position in this new
world of rationality and power as has the medical profession.” Id. Although
Professor Starr did not focus on the role of law, he notes some key legal
developments, such as the role of licensure. See id. at 102–03.
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various ways, law played an essential role in supporting the
medical profession’s growing autonomy and control. The
power of the profession can be linked to three legal domains:
licensure law, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine,
and medical malpractice.
B. Licensure and Self-Regulation
Licensure laws are an important example of both the
limits and power of law as a legitimating tool. Licensure may
protect the public by restricting the provision of services to
those who have met certain education and training criteria.6
Licensing regimes might also protect the public to the extent
that regulatory authorities monitor the capacity, skill, and
judgment of licensed practitioners.7 Licensing can
strengthen the profession from within by reinforcing
professional identity and permitting the development and
enforcement of practice standards and ethics-based
requirements. In addition, licensure may provide economic
benefits by excluding some potential competitors from
offering services within the licensed field of practice.8
Today, licensure as a component of professional practice
seems so ingrained as to be inevitable. Yet the early battles
over medical licensure in the United States demonstrate
otherwise. A number of states enacted medical licensure

6. See generally MARK A. HALL, DAVID ORENTLICHER, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI,
NICHOLAS BAGLEY & I. GLENN COHEN, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 1256–69 (9th
ed. 2018) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS]; Nadia N. Sawicki,
Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 285 (2010).
7. Richard E. Burney, Oversight of Medical Care Quality: Origins and
Evolution, 101 J. MED. REG. 8, 11 (2015) (noting oversight functions of state
boards).
8. For well-known critiques of licensure laws as unwarranted restrictions on
the market designed to benefit the licensees rather than the public, see generally
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137–160 (U. Chicago Press 2002)
(1962); Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
6 (1976). For a more recent critique, see generally Kevin Dayaratna et al.,
Reforming American Licensure, 42 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 253 (2019).
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laws in the late 1700s and early 1800s, yet by the mid-1800s
much of the legislation had been repealed. 9 Professor Starr
argues that these early licensure provisions were rejected as
illegitimate, as an “expression of favor rather than
competence.”10 Professor Lewis Grossman further contends
that this initial rejection of licensure demonstrates a popular
belief in “freedom of therapeutic choice” that is reflected, to
this day, in recurring debates over the balance between
government regulation and freedom of choice in health
care.11 The end result was that medical practitioners of
widely differing philosophies, education, training, and
experience were free to offer their services to patients in the
mid- to late-1800s.
Licensure reemerged to play an important role in
developing a coherent, powerful medical profession only
when coupled with the legitimating rationale of science.12
There were several competing schools of medical thought in
the late nineteenth century, which were united only by the
belief that licensure regimes should be implemented to
prevent “untrained practitioners” from treating patients. 13
They succeeded in promoting a new round of licensing
initiatives focused on ensuring that practitioners had
diplomas, although the legislation typically exempted
current practitioners from entry requirements.14 These
licensure regimes slowly began to become more detailed and
exacting.

9. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 4, at 58.
10. Id. (“A license was useful as a means of establishing authority only if it
was accepted as evidence of objective skill. But the belief that medical societies
and boards of censors were merely closed corporations, like the banks and
monopolies, utterly subverted their value as agencies of legitimation.”).
11. Lewis Grossman, The Origins of American Health Libertarianism, 13
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 76, 80 (2013).
12. See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 4, at 58–59.
13. Id. at 102 (noting the alliance of “regular” physicians with “homeopaths
and Eclectics”). See also, Grossman, supra note 11, at 80.
14. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 4, at 10.
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Legal challenges to physician licensure in the late 1800s
and early 1900s were rejected by courts up to and including
the Supreme Court of the United States.15 In Dent v. West
Virginia, the United States Supreme Court considered the
validity of a state statute criminalizing the practice of
medicine by those who had not obtained a certificate from the
state board of health.16 A claimant who had been convicted
under the legislation argued that it violated the Due Process
Clause of the Amendment because it deprived the defendant
of his “vested right and estate in his profession.”17 The Court
recognized that members of a profession had a potentially
valuable interest in being able to continue to practice that
could not be removed arbitrarily under the Due Process
Clause.18 However, the Court noted that “[t]he power of the
State to provide for the general welfare of its people
authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its
judgment, will secure or tend to secure them against the
consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of
deception and fraud.”19 States had wide latitude to impose

15. See Lawrence Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational
Licensing 1890–1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CAL. L. REV. 487, 493 n.29
(1965) (citing cases); see also STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 4, at
105–06.
16. West Virginia’s legislation
requires every practitioner of medicine . . . to obtain a certificate from
the State Board of Health that he is a graduate of a reputable medical
college in the school of medicine to which he belongs, or that he has
practiced medicine in the State continuously for the period of ten years
prior to the eighth day of March, 1881 or that he has been found, upon
examination by the Board, to be qualified to practice medicine in all its
departments, and makes the practice of, or the attempt by any person to
practice, medicine, surgery, or obstetrics in the State without such
certificate, unless called from another State to treat a particular case, a
misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, in the
discretion of the court.
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 115 (1889).
17. Id. at 121.
18. Id. at 122.
19. Id.
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entry criteria subject only to the requirements that the
criteria must bear some relation to the profession and that
they could be attained through “reasonable study and
application.”20
The Court noted the special characteristics of medical
practice that warranted regulations designed to protect
patients from potential harm:
Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks
to enter it than that of medicine. It has to deal with all those subtle
and mysterious influences upon which health and life depend, and
requires not only a knowledge of the properties of vegetable and
mineral substances, but of the human body in all its complicated
parts, and their relation to each other, as well as their influence
upon the mind. The physician must be able to detect readily the
presence of disease, and prescribe appropriate remedies for its
removal. Every one may have occasion to consult him, but
comparatively few can judge of the qualifications of learning and
skill which he possesses. Reliance must be placed upon the
assurance given by his license, issued by an authority competent to
judge in that respect, that he possesses the requisite
qualifications.21

20. Id.
21. Id. at 122–23. The Court also recognized that licensure requirements
could become more stringent over time without violating the Due Process Clause:
The same reasons which control in imposing conditions, upon
compliance with which the physician is allowed to practice in the first
instance, may call for further conditions as new modes of treating
disease are discovered, or a more thorough acquaintance is obtained of
the remedial properties of vegetable and mineral substances, or a more
accurate knowledge is acquired of the human system and of the agencies
by which it is affected. It would not be deemed a matter for serious
discussion that a knowledge of the new acquisitions of the profession, as
it from time to time advances in its attainments for the relief of the sick
and suffering, should be required for continuance in its practice, but for
the earnestness with which the plaintiff in error insists that, by being
compelled to obtain the certificate required, and prevented from
continuing in his practice without it, he is deprived of his right and
estate in his profession without due process of law. . . . No one has a right
to practice medicine without having the necessary qualifications of
learning and skill; and the statute only requires that whoever assumes,
by offering to the community his services as a physician, that he
possesses such learning and skill, shall present evidence of it by a
certificate or license from a body designated by the State as competent
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In Dent and other cases, state police powers were found
to be sufficiently broad to sustain licensure regimes that
could protect the public from incompetent or unethical
practitioners.22 Licensure thereafter played an increasingly
important role in building the medical profession in a
number of ways, including through the imposition of ever
more stringent education and training requirements, which,
combined with other factors, led to a reduction in the number
of medical students, the closure of marginal, low quality
medical schools, and reduced competition.23 Medical
licensing boards were also given authority to safeguard the
public by disciplining physicians for, among other things,
deficiencies in knowledge, skills, ethics, or capacity to
provide appropriate care.24
Medical licensure certainly played an important role in
building the profession, but self-regulation ensured that
physicians would maintain control over their own destiny.
The primary justification for self-regulation is implicit in the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dent: the complex scientific
and practice-oriented aspects of medical practice mean that
establishing and applying regulatory standards requires the
active involvement of members of the medical profession
itself.25 For much of the twentieth century, the health care
to judge of his qualifications.
Id. at 123.
22. Id. (“Due consideration, therefore, for the protection of society may well
induce the State to exclude from practice those who have not such a license, or
who are found upon examination not to be fully qualified . . . We perceive nothing
in the statute which indicates an intention of the legislature to deprive one of any
of his rights.”). See also Friedman, supra note 15, at 493 n.29 (citing cases);
STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 4, at 105–06.
23. See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 4, at 103–04 (discussing
the implementation of more rigorous standards); id. at 112–23 (noting the
reduction in number of students and the importance of the Flexner Report on
medical education, which recommended significant changes for medical
education, including the closure of low-performing medical schools).
24. See generally HEALTH CARE LAW
Sawicki, supra note 6.

AND

ETHICS, supra note 6 at 1256–69;

25. See Dent, 129 U.S. at 122–23 (noting that “comparatively few can judge of
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market in the United States was dominated by physicians,
who also controlled the regulation of medical practice
through state medical licensing boards led by physicians.26
The arrangement has been said to reflect a grand bargain, in
which the profession was given a monopoly over medical care
in exchange for agreeing to serve patients and to protect the
public.27 Yet, licensure combined with self-regulation creates
the obvious risk that the professed goal of protecting the
public may be weakened or subverted by the self-interest of
the profession.28 The medical profession’s successful use of
licensure to secure prestige and power attracted both critics
and imitators, as will be discussed in Part III below.
C. Maintaining Physician Control: Ethics and the
Corporate Practice of Medicine
Professional dominion over both technical and ethical
aspects of physician competence is another important
feature of medical licensure.29 The ethical requirements may
be reflected in general prohibitions, such as “[c]onduct in the
practice of medicine which evidences moral unfitness to

the qualifications of learning and skill” of medical practitioners).
26. See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson, Regulating Health Care: From SelfRegulation to Self-Regulation, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1165, 1167 (2001)
(“The predominant regulatory activity [before federal enactment of Medicare and
Medicaid] was through state licensure laws, which traditionally gave almost
complete control over who can practice medicine to the medical profession
itself.”).
27. Dr. Arnold S. Relman, who at the time served as the highly influential
editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, observed that “the medical
profession has an implicit contract with the state, which grants it a licensed
monopoly and a considerable degree of autonomy in exchange for a commitment
to serve patients and maintain its own professional standards.” Arnold S.
Relman, Professional Regulation and the State Medical Boards, 312 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 784, 785 (1985).
28. For a particularly sharp commentary on this topic, see FRIEDMAN , supra
note 8.
29. See generally Sawicki, supra note 6 (discussing modern medical
licensure).
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practice medicine.”30 The guidelines for professional practice
also typically include provisions governing specific concerns,
such as performing procedures without appropriate
consent,31 sexual activity with patients,32 undue influence
over patients,33 business relationships with other types of
licensed or unlicensed practitioners,34 advertising,35
maintenance of patient confidentiality,36 and violations of
codes of medical ethics.37 Many of these ethical standards
seem premised on the notion that physicians owe a duty of
loyalty to their patients, which is sometimes expressed as the
duty of physicians to serve patients’ interests over their own
self-interests in certain defined circumstances. The precise
nature of a physician’s duty of loyalty to his or her patients
has emerged as a contested issue in recent decades and will
be discussed further in Part IV.38
Importantly, these ethical rules also serve to shape the
permissible bounds of physicians’ relationships with other
professionals, health care payers, and other actors in the
30. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6530(20) (McKinney 2019); see also id. § 6524(7) (to
qualify for a physician’s license, applicants must “be of good moral character as
determined by the department”). Professor Nadia Sawicki observes that medical
boards frequently pursue disciplinary actions in “character”-related cases, such
as those brought after a physician has been convicted of a crime that is not
directly related to patient care; she argues that boards should shift their
disciplinary resources to address deficiencies in competency and patient care.
Sawicki, supra note 6, at 320–23.
31. E.g. EDUC. § 6530(26).
32. E.g. id. § 6530(44) (pertaining to psychiatrists and their patients).
33. E.g. id. § 6530(17) (including exploitation for financial gain).
34. E.g. id. § 6530(11) (permitting or facilitating unlicensed practice); id.
§ 6530(18) (prohibiting referral fees); id. § 6530(19) (regulating fee splitting).
35. E.g. id. § 6530(27) (prohibiting certain types of advertising).
36. E.g. id. § 6530(23) (prohibiting unauthorized disclosure of a patient’s
personally identifiable information).
37. Sawicki, supra note 6, at 293 (noting that “violations of codes of medical
ethics” may give rise to disciplinary action against physicians for “unprofessional
conduct”).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 171–201 for a discussion of fiduciary
duty.
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health care system. The corporate practice of medicine
doctrine is a particularly important example of the use of law
to reinforce physician control of health care. The doctrine,
which applies in a majority of states through legislation,
regulations, or court decisions, prohibits corporations from
engaging in the practice of medicine by directly employing or
otherwise controlling a physician’s practice of medicine.39
The rule has a number of different justifications, but
corporate control of medicine is typically considered to be
inconsistent with state licensure rules, which prohibit
unlicensed practice and then limit licenses to individual
applicants meeting certain eligibility criteria. Corporate
entities cannot meet these eligibility standards and therefore
are not permitted to practice medicine, directly or indirectly
through control of licensed practitioners.40 The prohibition
also reinforces both the centrality of the physician-patient
relationship in the health care system and the importance of
shielding the physician’s duty of loyalty to his or her patient
from external influence.41 The doctrine insulates physicians

39. See generally HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 1332–45;
Todd A. Rodriguez,, Rethinking the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine in the
Age of Consolidation, in 30 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 156–58 (Alice C. Gosfield, ed.
2018); CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: HEALTH
CARE: HEALTH CARE FACILITIES (2018), Westlaw 0100 Surveys 6; Annotation,
Right of Corporation or Individual, Not Himself Licensed, to Practise Medicine,
Surgery, or Dentistry through Licensed Employees, 103 A.L.R. 1240 (1936). States
often provide exceptions for certain types of authorized entities, such as
professional corporations, or licensed health care organizations, such as
hospitals. See, e.g., Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106,
112–14 (Ill. 1997); Cent. Kan. Med. Ctr. v. Hatesohl, 425 P.3d 1253, 1264–67
(Kan. 2018) (noting that corporate practice of medicine doctrine does not prevent
licensed ambulatory surgical center (ASC) from employing physicians to carry
out licensed services, but voiding a physician’s employment contract with an ASC
where services fell outside scope of ASC license).
40. See generally HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 1332–45; see
also sources cited supra note 39.
41. See, e.g., Corporate Practice of Medicine, MED. BOARD CAL.,
http://www.mbc.ca.gov/Licensees/Corporate_Practice.aspx (last visited Apr. 22,
2019) (“The policy . . . is intended to prevent unlicensed persons from interfering
with or influencing the physician’s professional judgment”). Interestingly, the
American Medical Association is no longer permitted to enforce its ethics-based
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from typical forms of organizational control.42
D. Physician Control of the Standard of Care in Medical
Malpractice
Medical malpractice law is the third major legal doctrine
establishing the power of the medical profession. This claim
may seem counterintuitive because medical malpractice law
is typically viewed as a means of empowering patients to
secure compensation for injuries caused by the negligence of
their physicians. Yet, a closer examination of malpractice
rules relating to the standard of care and expert witnesses
demonstrates the role of medical malpractice in establishing
and maintaining physician control over the practice of
medicine from the late 1800s to the mid- to late-1900s.
prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine because of the potential impact
on competition. See infra text accompanying notes 126–27; HEALTH CARE LAW
AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 1342; Am. Med. Ass’n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir.
1980), aff’d by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
42. The doctrine’s imprint can be seen in a number of disparate areas:
This body of law may appear obscure and antiquated, but it continues to
have fundamental importance for the structure of institutional and
economic relationships in American medicine. Observe, for instance,
that the prohibition of institutions charging for medical services
explains why doctors are paid separately from hospitals and why there
used to be a distinction between Blue Cross and Blue Shield and still is
between Medicare Part A and Part B. This doctrine also explains why,
only in North America, hospital medical staffs are independent and selfgoverning. Elsewhere in the world, hospital physicians are uniformly
employed or compensated by the hospital.
HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 1340. Many commentators view
the doctrine as an obstacle to health care reforms that could promote efficiency,
reduce costs, and facilitate integrated or team-based health care. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez, supra note 39 (arguing that the doctrine prevents investment and
integration of physicians within health systems); Mark A. Hall, Institutional
Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 510 (1988) (noting challenges for effective cost
containment); Nicole Huberfeld, Be Not Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 243, 276–91 (2004)
(advocating federal intervention to ensure that physicians can participate in
integrated health care practices); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Private Ordering
in the Market for Professional Services, 94 B.U. L. REV. 179, 193–94 (2014) (noting
the impact of the doctrine on raising costs and reducing access).
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The traditional approach to the standard of care in
medical malpractice cases focused on the “custom” of the
profession.43 As Professor Philip Peters observes:
In most negligence actions, the defendant’s compliance with
industry customs is simply one factor for the jury to consider. While
evidence of applicable customs is admissible, the jury is free to
demand more precautions than industry norms require. . . . [For
roughly 100 years, beginning in] the late nineteenth century,
however, courts . . . treated physicians quite differently. Medical
customs [were] not merely admissible, they define[d] the physician’s
legal standard of care. In the words of Dean Prosser, the custombased standard of care “gives the medical profession . . . the
privilege, which is usually emphatically denied to other groups, of
setting their own legal standards of conduct, merely by adopting
their own practices.” . . . The jury’s job . . . [has been] merely to
determine whether the defendant has complied with the industry
norms.44

The customary practice standard was associated with a
number of related doctrines. The “respectable minority” rule
protected physicians from liability so long as the care they
provided was consistent with that which would have been
offered by some other group of “respectable” physicians.45
Another doctrine protected physicians from liability for bad
outcomes resulting from “mere errors in judgment.” 46
Moreover, the locality rule protected physicians from liability
so long as the care they provided was consistent with local

43. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87
IOWA L. REV. 909, 911 (2002) [hereinafter Peters, Role of the Jury].
44. Id. at 912–13 (footnotes omitted).
45. See HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 304, 306–07; Philip G.
Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 168 (2000) [hereinafter Peters, Quiet
Demise]. See also Kenneth S. Abraham, Custom, Noncustomary Practice, and
Negligence, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1784, 1812 (2009) (noting the exceptional
approach adopted in medical malpractice cases regarding admissibility and the
potential conclusive impact of evidence that a defendant’s conduct complied with
a respectable minority or school of thought).
46. HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 304 (noting the
relationship of “errors in judgment” to the respectable minority rule); Peters,
Quiet Demise, supra note 45, at 167.

2019] CHALLENGES TO PHYSICIAN CONTROL

609

custom.47 The locality rule also created real barriers to
claims as physicians were often reluctant to offer expert
testimony critical of the care provided by other physicians in
their own communities.48
III. LAW AND THE RISE OF THE AUTONOMOUS
PATIENT/CONSUMER
A. Overview
Part II’s brief overview of the development of the medical
profession built on Paul Starr’s classic historical account by
highlighting the role of law in establishing physician
dominance and control over health care in the United States.
By the 1950s, the profession was in an enviable state.
Physician licensure established control over the delivery of
health care and self-regulation meant that the monitoring
and discipline functions were relatively weak.49 The
corporate practice of medicine doctrine ensured that
physicians remained free from control by non-physician
employers or institutions.50 The medical malpractice
standard provided substantial protection for physicians
providing care within a broad range of customary practice.
The expert witness requirements and the reluctance of
physicians to testify against their colleagues made it difficult
for patients to pursue claims.51 The stage was set for a new

47. See HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 307–08. See generally
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Standard of Care Owed to Patient by Medical
Specialist as Determined by Local, “Like Community,” State, National, or Other
Standards, 18 A.L.R.4th 603 (1982); James O. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Modern
Status of “Locality Rule” in Malpractice Action Against Physician Who Is Not a
Specialist, 99 A.L.R.3d 1133 (1980).
48. See Marc D. Ginsberg, The Locality Rule Lives! Why? Using Modern
Medicine to Eradicate an Unhealthy Law, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 321, 332–33 (2013)
(noting the impact of the locality rule on the availability of experts).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 6–28.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 29–42.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 43–48.
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set of legal battles and economic changes that would, in
combination, significantly alter the balance of power in
health care.
As the profession entered the 1960s, its “golden era” was
about to end. A number of factors joined together in a deep
challenge to the profession’s control over health care. In
retrospect, it is clear that the profession had been able to
exert control because of the absence of powerful
counterweights in the health care system. Although
hospitals were growing in importance, physicians
maintained significant control through the self-governing
nature of the medical staff within each institution.52 Health
insurance had become more prevalent beginning during
World War II, particularly as a benefit of employment, 53 but
insurers still typically provided reimbursement in
accordance with customary rates and were not prone to
second-guessing physician treatment decisions.54
Major changes in the organization and funding of health
care beginning in the 1960s would have a profound impact
on the profession.55 The enactment of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs in 1965 meant that governments became
keenly conscious of the growth of health care costs56 and
52. See supra note 41 (discussing corporate practice of medicine doctrine and
hospital staff structure).
53. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 4, at 311.
54. See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, Reimbursing
Physicians and Hospitals, 272 JAMA 971, 972 (1994) (discussing different
approaches to paying for physician services, including fee-for-service payment at
“usual, customary, and reasonable” rates).
55. The second half of Professor Starr’s history of the medical profession in
the United States charts a series of challenges to medical power, including the
rising power of public and private payers. Cf. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION,
supra note 4 (“Book Two: The Struggle for Medical Care”).
56. Id. at 383–84 (“Although medical costs were rising before 1965, they had
been regarded mainly as a problem for individuals and families. Congress
generally favored increasing total health expenditures in the belief that medical
care was a prudent and popular social investment. After 1970, however, public
officials began to regard the aggregate costs of health care as too high and to
doubt that the investment was worth the return in health.”).
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government as payer quickly became government as
regulator. Employers saddled with increasingly expensive
health care plans began to look for ways to reduce exposure
by distributing a portion of health care costs to their
employees and through new forms of coverage designed to
restrain costs.57 Physician control of the health care system
meant that efforts to control costs invariably involved—or
perhaps more accurately, targeted—physicians.58 A series of
reforms, including the growth of managed care and capitated
payment systems, were designed to give physicians
incentives to reduce health care expenditures.59
Without understating the importance of these economic
changes, this section will seek to highlight the role of law in
challenging physician control and in strengthening the
power of other actors in the health care system. The
profession’s successful use of law to cement control in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century virtually ensured
that future battles over control in health care would have a
substantial legal component. Part III of this Article will focus
on two major law-based assaults to physician dominance
beginning in the 1960s: judicial efforts to rebalance the
power in the physician-patient relationship through
informed consent law and challenges to the medical
profession’s use of licensure to control the health care
marketplace.
57. Id. at 444 (“Private insurers and employers want[ed] medical
expenditures to be controlled.”)
58. These cost-containment efforts clearly challenged physician control. For a
particularly thoughtful analysis, see generally Hall, supra note 42.
59. See id. at 436–37. Physicians subject to new payment systems became
even more entrepreneurial actors in the health care marketplace. See, e.g., Arnold
S. Relman, The Future of Medical Practice, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1983, at 5, 11–
13 (commenting on rise of physician entrepreneurialism). The federal
government, concerned about the impact of physician entrepreneurialism on the
quality and cost of health care, increased legislative and enforcement initiatives
designed to restrict certain types of entrepreneurial activities. See, e.g., ALICE G.
GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE, Westlaw (database
updated June 2018); HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 1444–65
(discussing referral fee laws.).

612

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

B. Empowering Patients through Informed Consent Law
and Medical Malpractice Law
Legal theorists sometimes debate the transformative
power of law, questioning whether new legal rules truly
change society or whether a new legal approach merely
reflects the influence of societal changes already underway.60
That debate surely will not be resolved here. Yet, within
health care law, the best potential example of the
transformative power of law undoubtedly comes from the
development of modern informed consent law.
The basic right of patients to consent to, or to refuse to
consent to, health care has a long history within the law of
battery.61 As the New York Court of Appeals famously stated
in Schloendorff v. Society of New York, “Every human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs
an operation without his patient’s consent commits an
assault, for which he is liable in damages.” 62 The battery
action has certain advantages for the plaintiff. For example,
the action does not require the use of expert witnesses and
carries with it the potential for a punitive damage award. 63
Yet there are disadvantages: courts may limit battery actions

60. Cf. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (analyzing the origins and
impact of the Supreme Court’s major civil rights decisions); PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (exploring the
relationship between major Supreme Court decisions and public opinion).
61. See generally W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Liability of Physician or Surgeon
for Extending Operation or Treatment Beyond the Expressly Authorized, 56
A.L.R.2d 695 (1957).
62. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig,
143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
63. See HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 172–73. Courts
occasionally are confronted with battery claims brought by plaintiffs seeking to
avoid expert witness or other requirements established for medical malpractice
claims. See, e.g., Humbolt Gen. Hosp., v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 376 P.3d 167
(Nev. 2016) (battery claim raising informed consent issues must comply with
medical expert requirement established for medical malpractice actions).
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to a narrow range of medical treatment that involves
physical intrusion into the body and the claims generally
have shorter limitations periods.64 In addition, “consent” in a
battery action typically is understood to involve basic
consent to the procedure itself.65
The courts began to develop a broader conception of
consent located within medical malpractice law rather than
battery. Here, the question was whether the physician had
provided sufficient information to the patient to ensure that
the consent was “informed.” There was a significant debate
about the existence of and scope of the physician’s duty to
obtain informed consent. One major problem was the
standard of care within medical malpractice law, which was
defined by customs of the profession and which offered
protection from liability so long as the physician followed
general custom or at least a respectable minority approach
to the provision of information.66 The physician’s duty to
provide information about a proposed treatment therefore
was limited by the customs of the profession, which at the
time did not include substantial discussion of the risks and
benefits of treatment and its alternatives.67
Nearly fifty years ago, in Canterbury v. Spence, the

64. HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 172–73. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating battery
requires “harmful or offensive contact.”); see generally E.H. Schopler, Annotation,
Statute of Limitations Applicable to Malpractice Action Against Physician,
Surgeon, Dentist or Similar Practitioner, 80 A.L.R.2d 320 (1961).
65. HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 172–73. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 53 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Consent to the
particular conduct applies to intentional invasions of interests of personality.”).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 43–45.
67. In Canterbury v. Spence, the court noted that
[t]here are, in our view, formidable obstacles to acceptance of the notion
that the physician’s obligation to disclose is either germinated or limited
by medical practice. To begin with, the reality of any discernible custom
reflecting a professional concensus [sic] on communication of option and
risk information to patients is open to serious doubt.
464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).

614

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted a new
approach which had a transformative impact on the power
balance in the physician-patient relationship.68 The court
considered the case of Jerry Canterbury, a nineteen year old
clerk with a history of back pain who had sought care from
Dr. William Spence, who was a Washington, D.C.
neurosurgeon.69 Dr. Spence recommended a laminectomy
and secured consent for the procedure from Mr. Canterbury
and his mother; Mr. Canterbury had consented without
“prob[ing] into [the operation’s] exact nature.”70 Mrs.
Canterbury had a telephone conversation with the surgeon
in which she asked whether the “operation was serious”; Dr.
Spence characterized the procedure as “not anymore [sic]
than any other operation.”71 Although the operation was
uneventful, Mr. Canterbury developed partial paralysis after
falling out of his hospital bed during his recovery.72 Mr.
Canterbury brought various claims against the surgeon and
hospital, including a claim of negligence for failing to inform
him about the risks of the procedure, but he was unable to
present expert testimony to support his claims.73 The trial
court awarded directed verdicts to the defendants and
Canterbury appealed.74
The appeals court reversed, holding that the evidence
was sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the
physician’s duty to obtain informed consent.75 The court took
a novel path to this conclusion through various potential
68. Id. Although Canterbury is typically recognized as the leading informed
consent case, the California Supreme Court offered a similar approach in Cobbs
v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972) (limiting the need for expert testimony in cases
involving alleged violations of the physician’s duty to disclose risks).
69. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 776.
70. Id. at 777.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 777–78.
73. Id. at 778.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 779.
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sources of law and into specific rulings about important
matters, such as the scope of the duty to disclose, 76 limits to
the duty,77 the role of causation,78 and the limited need for
experts.79 I will focus on two key aspects of the decision here:
the source and the scope of the duty to disclose.
Given the need to avoid the restrictions of traditional
malpractice actions during this time period, the Canterbury
court took a broad view regarding the sources of the duty to
disclose that wove together a review of legal doctrines and an
assessment of the power relationship between physicians
and their patients. The Canterbury decision draws on battery
law, medical malpractice, and fiduciary law to develop the

76. Id. at 786–87 (“The scope of the physician’s communications to the
patient, then, must be measured by the patient’s need, and that need is the
information material to the decision[,]” measured objectively, from the standpoint
of a reasonable patient).
77. The Canterbury court outlined several limits to the duty to disclose: (a)
the emergency exception permitted treatment without consent if the patient was
incapacitated and no relative was available to provide substituted consent; and
(b) the therapeutic privilege permitted physicians to withhold information from
the patient where disclosure would “present a threat to the patient’s well-being,”
though substituted consent from a relative might be required. Id. at 788–89. The
court also suggested that physicians could not be held liable for failures to
disclose information that the patient already knew. Id. at 792 (referring to
“patient’s lack of knowledge of the risk”).
78. The court established an objective standard of causation in informed
consent cases. Causation was to be determined from the standpoint of what “a
prudent person in the patient’s position would have decided if suitably informed
of all perils bearing significance. If adequate disclosure could reasonably be
expected to have caused that person to decline the treatment because of the
revelation of the kind of risk or danger that resulted in harm, causation is shown,
but otherwise not.” Id. at 791 (citations omitted). The court rejected the subjective
approach to causation due to concerns that this approach would “place[] the
physician in jeopardy of the patient’s hindsight and bitterness.” Id. at 790–91
(noting as well the burden placed on the fact finder to speculate about causation
“shadowed” by the knowledge that the undisclosed risk had materialized).
79. The court noted that many aspects of the informed consent claim could be
established by lay witnesses, offering “relative freedom of broad areas of the legal
problem of risk nondisclosure from the demands for expert testimony that
shackle plaintiffs’ other types of medical malpractice litigation.” Id. at 792
(citation omitted).
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scope of a physician’s duty to disclose.80
After citing Schloendorff’s stirring paean to the
protection of individual autonomy via battery law, the court
noted:
True consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed exercise
of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate
knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon
each. The average patient has little or no understanding of the
medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can
look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision.
From these almost axiomatic considerations springs the need, and
in turn the requirement, of a reasonable divulgence by physician to
patient to make such a decision possible.81

The court thus relied on battery law to establish the
centrality of choice in the protection of individual autonomy
but then relied on the knowledge imbalance between
physician and patient to demonstrate the need to impose
disclosure to ensure “true consent.”82
Medical malpractice law offered a vehicle for holding
physicians liable for injuries caused by a deviation from the
standard of care. The key question, of course, was how to
define the standard of care for disclosure. As a preliminary
matter, the court focused on establishing that the duty of
care could incorporate a duty to disclose information:
A physician is under a duty to treat his patient skillfully but
proficiency in diagnosis and therapy is not the full measure of his
responsibility. The cases demonstrate that the physician is under
an obligation to communicate specific information to the patient
when the exigencies of reasonable care call for it. Due care may
require a physician perceiving symptoms of bodily abnormality to
alert the patient to the condition. . . . It may oblige the physician to
advise the patient of the need for or desirability of any alternative
treatment promising greater benefit than that being pursued. Just
as plainly, due care normally demands that the physician warn the

80. Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from
Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 342 n.184 (1994).
81. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 (citations omitted).
82. Id.
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patient of any risks to his well-being which contemplated therapy
may involve.83

Significantly, the court addressed malpractice through
the lens of reasonableness, rather than custom. The court
recognized that a majority of jurisdictions considering the
issue had adopted a custom-based standard of care and
acknowledged that there likely was no custom or practice of
providing disclosure.84 However, the court noted that there
was little need to resort to custom “where the physician’s
activity does not bring his medical knowledge and skills
peculiarly into play” and held that the duty to disclose would
be measured by what is “reasonable under the
circumstances.”85
Finally, the court relied on principles drawn from
fiduciary law to justify departing from the standard of care
measured by custom to impose a standard of disclosure
measured by the informational needs of the patient. The
court noted:
The patient’s reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which
traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated with
arms-length transactions. His dependence upon the physician for
information affecting his well-being, in terms of contemplated
treatment, is well-nigh abject. . . . [L]ong before the instant
litigation arose, courts had recognized that the physician had the
responsibility of satisfying the vital informational needs of the
patient. More recently, we ourselves have found “in the fiducial
qualities of [the physician-patient] relationship the physician’s duty
to reveal to the patient that which in his best interests it is
important that he should know.” We now find, as a part of the
physician’s overall obligation to the patient, a similar duty of
reasonable disclosure of the choices with respect to proposed
therapy and the dangers inherently and potentially involved.86

In effect, the Canterbury court mixed together battery,

83. Id. at 781 (citations omitted).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 66–67.
85. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 785.
86. Id. at 782 (citations omitted).
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malpractice and fiduciary law and, through judicial alchemy,
created a new doctrine that both recognized and challenged
physician authority over health care. Because physicians
held the power and knowledge in the relationship, patients
were unlikely to make inquiries or to question their
physicians’ treatment recommendations.87 True consent
therefore required a judicially-mandated transfer of
information from physician to patient. The court imposed a
negligence-based duty on the physician to disclose the
material risks and benefits of the proposed care and its
alternatives, that is, to provide the information that a
reasonable patient would need in deciding whether or not to
undergo a recommended treatment.88
The Canterbury court’s new, “patient-centered” approach
to the physician’s duty to disclose had wide ranging effects.89
It reduced the profession’s control over an important aspect
of medical practice. At the same time, it used the transfer of
knowledge to empower patients within the physician-patient
relationship. The case reinforced the roles of patients as
decision-makers and of physicians as loyal servants of
patients’ interests. It also sowed seeds for future debates
about the extent to which courts would use common law
doctrines such as fiduciary obligations to protect vulnerable
patients in other circumstances.90
The Canterbury decision initiated a state-by-state debate
about the appropriate standard of disclosure in informed
consent cases that was carried out in the courts and
87. Id. at 783 n.36.
88. Id. at 786–87 (“The scope of the physician’s communications to the
patient, then, must be measured by the patient’s need, and that need is the
information material to the decision”) (citations omitted).
89. As important as Canterbury is from a legal perspective, it must be noted
that it yielded little benefit for Jerry Canterbury, as Dr. Spence won a defense
verdict at trial. Sam Roberts, Jerry Canterbury, Whose Paralysis Led to Informed
Consent Laws, Is Dead at 78, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/us/jerry-canterbury-medical-consentparalysis.html.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 177–202.
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legislatures. Canterbury’s patient-centered, material risk
standard is used in about half of the states with almost as
many states retaining the professional or “regular” medical
malpractice standard.91 This jurisdictional tally might
suggest that Canterbury’s impact has been overstated. But,
it is important to recognize that the Canterbury approach
has been largely adopted by the medical profession itself—
which means that the idea of the empowered patient is
present in every jurisdiction.92 In one classic decision, the
Indiana Supreme Court even held that the “reasonably
prudent physician” standard adopted for medical
malpractice cases subsumed within it the American Medical
Association’s (AMA’s) acceptance of the physician’s ethical
obligation to provide patients with the information needed to
decide whether or not to consent to treatment. 93
The Canterbury court’s analysis of the limits of the
91. HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 171 (noting as well that
two states use a hybrid approach). See also Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Promise
of Informed Consent, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 218 (I.
Glenn Cohen et al., eds. 2017).
92. For a seminal discussion of the physician-patient relationship that
directly addresses the role of information in securing autonomy, see JAY KATZ,
THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (Revised Ed., 2002). An analysis by
decade of articles published in the New England Journal of Medicine
demonstrates the integration of “informed consent” into medical discourse. From
1950–59, no articles used the expression “informed consent.” The phrase
appeared in 38 articles from 1960–69. In the 1970s, the decade of the Canterbury
decision, 508 published articles used the phrase. By the 1990s, 1,500 articles
included the phrase. The article total has hovered around 1,800 per decade over
the past two decades. This rough counting system reflects raw numbers and does
not analyze context or control for the number of articles published per decade.
However, it is worth noting in contrast the trend for the use of words
“malpractice” or “negligence” (but excluding “negligible”). There were 32 articles
using these words in the 1950s. The tally rose to a high of 196 articles in the
1980s. Only 64 articles using these words have been published in the 2010s as of
November 6, 2018. Analysis conducted November 6, 2018, using New England
Journal of Medicine “Advanced Search” Function. Data on file with the author.
93. See Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 103–04 (Ind. 1992). The court’s
retention of the traditional malpractice frame for informed consent was
nonetheless significant as the standard required plaintiffs to present expert
witnesses regarding the precise scope and potential breach of the disclosure
standard. Id. at 106 (Dickson, J., dissenting).
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custom-based malpractice standard also reflected a wider
debate about the appropriate standard of care to employ in
medical malpractice cases more generally, outside of
informed consent. The profession enjoyed the protection of
the “custom” rule into the 1970s, when courts began to move
away from that standard and toward the implementation of
the “reasonably prudent physician” standard. 94 In many
states, the standard of care is now expressed as the care that
would be expected of a reasonably prudent, minimally
competent physician in similar circumstances, though
jurisdictions use slightly different formulas of words,
deviations from which can have significant legal
consequences.95 Although the reasonable physician standard
for medical malpractice claims maintains a strong element
of physician control, as medical experts will be required in
the vast majority of cases,96 the reasonableness standard is
typically viewed as less deferential to physicians.97

94. Peters, Quiet Demise, supra note 45, at 164; see also Peters, Role of the
Jury, supra note 43, 913–16 (reviewing movement from custom to reasonableness
in state court decisions).
95. HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 294–95.
96. See generally H.H. Henry, Annotation, Necessity of Expert Evidence to
Support an Action for Malpractice against a Physician or Surgeon, 81 A.L.R.2d
597 (1962).
97. See John W. Ely et al., Determining the Standard of Care in Medical
Malpractice: The Physician’s Perspective, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 869 (2002)
(reporting that a focus group of physicians generally viewed customary standard
of care as more protective than reasonable physician standard). The potential for
liability under the reasonableness standard has in turn sparked discussion about
whether physician adherence to practice guidelines—a new form of “custom”—
might create a presumption of compliance with the standard of care. For a
thoughtful discussion of efforts to use practice guidelines to reassert professional
control over the standard of care, see Maxwell J. Mehlman, Professional Power
and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 44 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1165, 1188 & 1230–32
(2012).
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C. Autonomous Patients Become Health Care Consumers in
an Expanded Medical Marketplace
1. Overview
The informed consent doctrine can be seen as the
beginning of an important shift in the position of the
recipients of medical services. The mandated transfer of
information from physician to patient at least theoretically
empowered patients to exercise greater control over health
care decisions.98 An equally profound shift in the physicianpatient relationship has occurred in the decades since
Canterbury v. Spence: the move from patient to consumer.
There are many extra-legal explanations for the shift
from the “empowered patient” to “health care consumer.”
Skepticism about authority grew beginning in the 1960s and
has become ubiquitous.99 Waves of patient advocacy on
critical issues such as women’s health,100 mental illness,101
98. Many medical and legal commentators have addressed informed consent
from a range of salutary and critical perspectives. Professor Carl E. Schneider
has been a particularly influential critic of the disclosures mandated under the
informed consent doctrine. See, e.g., CARL E. SCHNEIDER, PATIENTS, DOCTORS AND
MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998); OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN
YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014) (critiquing
use of mandated disclosure to protect autonomy in a number of settings,
including informed consent).
99. Vaccine debates are an important, current example of skepticism about
medicine. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So
Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 353, 388–406 (2004); Ron Klain, Politics and Pandemics, 379 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2191 (2018).
100. See, e.g., SANDRA MORGEN, INTO OUR OWN HANDS: THE WOMEN’S HEALTH
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1990 (2002) (presenting a history of the
women’s health movement, including efforts to move the locus of control from
physicians to women themselves).
101. Two significant critiques of psychiatry were published early in the 1960s:
MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION (Richard Howard trans., Vintage
Books 1988) (1961) and THOMAS SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS:
FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT (Harper & Row 1974) (1961).
Patients turned to activism in the 1960s–70s. See generally Norman Dain, Critics
and Dissenters: Reflections on “Anti-Psychiatry” in the United States, 25 J. HIST.
OF BEHAV. SCI. 3 (1989).
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breast cancer,102 and HIV/AIDS103 have challenged the
medical establishment’s views about appropriate care.
Moreover, there has been a dramatic expansion in the
amount of medical information available to patients outside
of the physician—patient relationship. Initially, this
information could be found in magazines and popular
books,104 but the arrival of the Internet dramatically
increased access to health-related information.105 The web
also facilitated patient-patient communication about
diseases, treatments, and health providers.106 Finally,
102. See, e.g., Susan Braun, The History of Breast Cancer Advocacy, 9 BREAST
J. S101 (Suppl. 2) (2003); Barron H. Lerner, Breast Cancer Activism: Past
Lessons, Future Directions, 2 NATURE REVIEWS CANCER 225 (2002); Janet R.
Osuch et al., A Historical Perspective on Breast Cancer Activism in the United
States: From Education and Support to Partnership in Scientific Research, 21 J.
WOMEN’S HEALTH 355 (2012).
103. See, e.g., DAVID FRANCE, HOW TO SURVIVE A PLAGUE: THE INSIDE STORY OF
HOW CITIZENS AND SCIENCE TAMED AIDS (2016); Robert M. Wachter, AIDS,
Activism, and the Politics of Health, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 128 (1992) (discussing
history of AIDS-related activism; noting relationship with other forms of patient
activism).
104. For example, Prevention Magazine, which was founded in 1950, was
originally marketed as “a medical journal for the people.” Brian Pedersen,
Rodale’s Prevention magazine to go ad-free, increase price by 25 percent, LVB.COM
(Feb. 2, 2016, 10:43 AM), https://www.lvb.com/rodales-prevention-magazine-togo-ad-free-increase-price-by-25-percent/. The magazine was finally sold to Hearst
in 2018. Hearst Completes Acquisition of Rodale Inc. Magazine Media Brands,
HEARST (Jan. 1, 2018), http://www.hearst.com/newsroom/hearst-completesacquisition-of-rodale-inc-magazine-media-brands. See also Our Story, OUR
BODIES OUR SELVES, https://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/our-story/ (last visited
Apr. 29, 2019) (providing historical resources for the iconic self-help book first
published in 1969).
105. See, e.g., Madison K. Kilbride & Steven Joffe, The New Age of Patient
Autonomy: Implications for the Patient-Physician Relationship, 320 JAMA 1973,
1973 (2018) (“Today’s patients, informed by the internet and social media, are
increasingly less dependent on their physicians for access to medical information
and resources.”).
106. See, e.g., A. Benetoli et al., How Patients’ Use of Social Media Impacts
Their Interactions with Healthcare Professionals, 101 PATIENT EDUC. &
COUNSELING 439, 440 (2018) (noting most study participants “reported
improvement in the patient-[healthcare provider] relationship due to increased
knowledge, better communication, and empowerment”); Gunther Eysenbach et
al., Health Related Virtual Communities and Electronic Support Groups:
Systematic Review of the Effects of Online Peer to Peer Interactions, 328 BMJ 1166
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relating to patients as consumers has become increasingly
important in health coverage initiatives such as consumerdriven health care107 and the Affordable Care Act’s
healthcare marketplace.108
The evolution—or transmogrification—from passive
patients, to empowered patients, to consumers, occurred
alongside several significant changes in the licensure
bulwark that had protected the medical profession and the
profession’s control over health care. I will focus on three
licensure-related developments here: (1) the addition of
public or consumer board members; (2) the growth of
antitrust challenges to professional control; and (3) the
emergence of new types of providers.
2. Changes to the Composition of Medical Boards
As noted above, the medical profession’s control over
medical licensure creates the risk that the process might be
redirected, subtly or substantially, away from protection of
the public.109 Indeed, numerous studies have suggested that
risk has become reality, and that medical boards have at
least sometimes adopted regulatory standards, employed
processes, and achieved outcomes that serve the profession

(2004) (noting dearth of research into impact of “consumer led peer to peer
communities,” including online support groups).
107. See generally Mark Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers:
Courts, Contracts and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643
(2008) (discussing “consumer-driven health care” initiatives such as health care
savings accounts that require patients to negotiate directly with health care
providers about charges and payment; noting need for further protections for
patient-consumers).
108. The “healthcare marketplace” was one of several key components of the
Affordable Care Act. The marketplace is a portal for individuals and families
seeking health care insurance that is designed to “promote enrollment and
rational consumer choice.” Jon Kingsdale, After the False Start—What Can We
Expect from the New Health Insurance Marketplaces?, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 393,
394 (2014); Get Coverage, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov (last
visited Apr. 29, 2019).
109. See supra text accompanying note 28.

624

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

more than the public interest.110 States concerned about the
appearance or reality of regulatory capture initiated a range
of reforms in the 1960s and 1970s.111 The emergence of
empowered patient/consumers offered one potential
“antidote” to board self-interest and states began to add
110. Some of the criticism stems from studies carried out by media or public
interest organizations. See, e.g., ALAN LEVINE ET AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN, STATE
MEDICAL BOARDS FAIL TO DISCIPLINE DOCTORS WITH HOSPITAL ACTIONS AGAINST
THEM (2011), https://www.citizen.org/our-work/health-and-safety/state-medicalboards-fail-discipline-doctors-hospital-actions-2; Carrie Teegardin & Lois
Norder, Abusive Doctors: How the Atlanta Newspaper Exposed a System That
Tolerates Sexual Misconduct by Physicians, 19 AM. J. BIOETHICS, no. 1, 2019, at
1; Lisa Girion & Scott Glover, Dying for Relief, Reckless Prescribing of Narcotics
Endangers Patients, Eludes Regulators, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2012),
https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2012-dec-09-la-me-prescription-oversight20121209-story.html.
The criticisms are mirrored in professional and academic articles. See, e.g.,
James M. DuBois et al., Serious Ethical Violations in Medicine: A Statistical and
Ethical Analysis of 280 Cases in the United States from 2008–2016, 19 AM. J.
BIOETHICS, no. 1, 2019, at 16, 25 (“We would argue that the data presented in this
article suggest that the field of medicine has self-regulated in a manner that
protects self-interests above patient interests.”); Dayaratna et al., supra note 8,
at 268–72 (summarizing critique of patient protection rationale for licensure.);
John Alexander Harris & Elena Byhoff, Variations by State in Physician
Disciplinary Actions by U.S. Medical Licensure Boards, 26 BMJ QUALITY &
SAFETY 200 (2017) (finding and expressing concern about “significant, fourfold
variation” in annual rates of disciplinary actions across states.); Timothy S. Jost,
Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Management or the Market,
37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 863–64 (1995) (noting the reluctance of physician-dominated
medical boards to challenge the competency of physicians.); Relman, supra note
27, at 785 (after noting the high degree of variability in disciplinary rates among
the states, Dr. Relman concludes that “[a]ll the evidence suggests, therefore, that
most if not all the states have been too lax—not too strict—in their enforcement
of medical professional standards.”). For contrary views, see, e.g., Humayun J.
Chaudhry et al, Ensuring Competency and Professionalism Through State
Medical Licensing, 313 JAMA 1791 (2015) (providing a generally laudatory
perspective on the enduring success of state medical boards.); Marc T. Law &
Zeynep K. Hansen, Medical Licensing Board Characteristics and Physician
Discipline: An Empirical Analysis, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 63, 90–91 (2010)
(describing a study of the relationship between selected characteristics of medical
boards and rates of disciplinary activity; the authors contrast the “golden age of
power and prestige” for medical profession, in which boards focused on protecting
economic interests, with modern era, in which “the medical establishment found
it to be in its own self-interest to monitor doctors more carefully.”).
111. See DAVID A. JOHNSON & HUMAYUN J. CHAUDHRY, MEDICAL LICENSING AND
DISCIPLINE IN AMERICA 155–198 (2012).
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“public” or “consumer” members to state medical boards in
the 1960s.112 Public members are commonplace on medical
boards today.113 Despite the promising nature of this reform,
studies have not found a significant impact on the rates of
disciplinary actions.114
3. Antitrust Challenges to the Domination of the
Medical Profession
The second key licensure-related development involves
the growing use of antitrust law to challenge professional
domination. As noted in Part II, physician licensure allowed
physicians to exclude competitors from a broad swath of
medical care services and, through rules governing physician
relationships with other providers and institutions, to ensure
continuing physician control over the health care
marketplace.115 This high level of marketplace control was
justified by the profession’s expertise, its adherence to
ethical standards, and its commitment to selfless service of
patients and the public.116 Of course, another way of
describing the situation would be that the profession had a
monopoly power over the provision of medical services that
permitted it to exclude competitors and to extract higher
payment for services than might otherwise be the case.

112. See Chaudhry et al., supra note 110, at 1791 (noting that the Medical
Board of California named a public member in 1961.).
113. Id. (“[A]lmost all state medical boards include public members”).
114. See, e.g., Law & Hansen, supra note 110, at 87 (“[T]he share of outside
membership on the board has no statistically significant effect on the degree of
physician discipline”; the authors also note the addition of lay members coincided
with “changes in the health care environment [that] forced medical boards to
become more accountable in general.”). In addition, public members typically
occupy a relatively small percentage of board positions, leaving physicians with
effective control through a majority or supermajority of members. Carrie H.K.
Yam et al., Ten Key Trends Emerging from an International Review, 102 J. MED.
REG., Mar. 2016, at 16, 21–22 (2016) (noting an international trend toward public
involvement, but reporting the percentage of lay members for Florida at 20% and
Texas at 37%.).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28, & 39.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 25–27 & 41.
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Physician control thus raised concerns that lie in the realm
of antitrust law. Yet antitrust challenges to physician control
began to take root only in the late 1970s.117
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the United States
Supreme Court considered a challenge brought by a couple
attempting to buy a home who were required as a part of the
transaction to obtain a title examination. 118 The couple were
unable to find a lawyer willing to provide the service for less
than the minimum fee established by the local and state bar
associations and they, thereafter, filed a class action claim
for price fixing under section 1 of the Sherman Act.119 The
bar association argued it should be protected from antitrust
scrutiny because Congress did not intend to “include the
learned professions within the terms ‘trade or commerce’ in
§ 1 of the Sherman Act,” and because “competition is
inconsistent with the practice of a profession because
enhancing profit is not the goal of professional activities; the
goal is to provide services necessary to the community.”120
The Court rejected the assertion that professions should be
exempt from antitrust principles, holding instead that “[t]he
nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide
sanctuary from the Sherman Act, nor is the public-service

117. In a few earlier cases, the United States Supreme Court had suggested
that the medical profession might be protected from antitrust scrutiny to some
extent. In United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, the court noted:
there are ethical considerations where the historic direct relationship
between patient and physician is involved which are quite different than
the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial matters.
This Court has recognized that forms of competition usual in the
business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a
profession.
343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952) (citing Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294
U.S. 608 (1935)).
118. 421 U.S. 773, 773 (1975).
119. Id.; Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”).
120. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 786.
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aspect of professional practice controlling in determining
whether § 1 includes professions.”121 However, the Supreme
Court left the door open to moderating the impact of
antitrust principles to reflect the special characteristics of
professions in some cases.122
Goldfarb was followed by a number of important
decisions applying antitrust law to various health care
arrangements.123 For our purposes, the key rulings are those
in which courts demonstrate a willingness to “look behind”
rules facially based on the desire to help patients, to
maintain the ethics of the profession, or to promote the
quality of care, to address the profession’s potentially
anticompetitive activities. For example, in Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society, the Supreme Court
considered an antitrust challenge to a maximum fee schedule
established by the majority vote of physician members of two
medical foundations that would be applied to patients
insured by foundation-approved plans.124 The Supreme
Court found the arrangement to be a per se unlawful price-

121. Id. at 787 (citations omitted).
122. In a famous footnote the Court noted:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that
particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to
view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business
activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust
concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and
other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other
situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
Id. at 788 n.17.
123. A full discussion of health care-related antitrust law is beyond the scope
of this paper. For a summary of antitrust cases relating to health care, see
HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 1379–1444 (discussing general
principles, medical staff boycotts, price-fixing, and health care mergers); Spencer
Weber Waller, How Much of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, 48 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 643 (2017).
124. 457 U.S. 332, 332 (1982).
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fixing arrangement under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
despite the participants’ claim that the arrangement would
actually benefit patients.125
Antitrust laws have also been used to challenge ethical
rules or guidelines. In American Medical Association v. FTC,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
considered the validity of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
order “require[ing] the AMA to cease and desist from
promulgating, implementing and enforcing restraints on
advertising, solicitation, and contract practices by physicians
and on contractual arrangements between physicians and
nonphysicians.”126 The court upheld the FTC’s findings that
these “ethical restraints”—including restrictions on the
corporate practice of medicine—actually had the “purpose
and effect of restraining competition.”127 Antitrust law also
brought to an end the AMA’s long-standing efforts to
discredit chiropractic care and to prevent physicians from
associating with chiropractors, despite the AMA’s assertion
that its policies were designed to protect patients from
unscientific “quackery.”128 In Wilk v. American Medical

125. The Court noted:
The price-fixing agreements in this case . . . are not premised on public
service or ethical norms. The respondents do not argue . . . that the
quality of the professional service that their members provide is
enhanced by the price restraint. The respondents’ claim for relief from
the per se rule is simply that the doctors’ agreement not to charge certain
insureds more than a fixed price facilitates the successful marketing of
an attractive insurance plan. But the claim that the price restraint will
make it easier for customers to pay does not distinguish the medical
profession from any other provider of goods or services.
Id. at 349.
126. 638 F.2d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d by an equally divided court, 455
U.S. 676 (1982). The FTC order targeted provisions in the 1971 version of the
AMA’s Principles of Medical Ethics under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. Id. at 449 (citing Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5(a) (1), 15
U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (1)).
127. Id. at 449.
128. The battle between chiropractors and the AMA is summarized in Wilk v.
American Medical Association (Wilk II), 895 F.2d 352, 355–57 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Association, the United States Court of Appeal for the
Seventh Circuit upheld a determination “that the AMA
violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by conducting an illegal
boycott of chiropractors” and affirmed the grant of an
injunction against the AMA.129
Finally, and most importantly from the standpoint of
medical licensure, recent developments make clear that the
actions of medical licensing boards that are controlled by
physicians may also be subject to antitrust review. In North
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, the
Supreme Court considered an order of the FTC prohibiting
the dental board from various actions designed to exclude
non-dentists from the provision of teeth whitening
services.130 North Carolina’s Dental Practice Act provided
that the Board was “‘the agency of the State for the
regulation of the practice of dentistry’”; further, under the
Act, “six of the Board’s eight members must be licensed
dentists engaged in the active practice of dentistry.”131
In Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court had determined
that the antitrust laws “confer[red] immunity on
anticompetitive conduct by States when acting in their
sovereign capacity.”132 The Supreme Court rejected the
Dental Board’s assertion that the Parker immunity doctrine

129. Id. at 378. In Wilk I, the appeals court had permitted the AMA to pursue
a potential “patient care” defense to the antitrust action. Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n
(Wilk I), 719 F.2d 207, 227 (7th Cir. 1983) (establishing a four-part patient care
defense). The AMA failed to prove the defense on remand. Wilk II, 895 F.2d at
362. In Wilk II, the court noted that recent cases had cast doubt on the continuing
validity of the patient care defense but found that the AMA’s failure to prove the
defense eliminated the need to resolve the question. Id.
130. 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108–09 (2015).
131. Id. at 1107–08.
132. 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51
(1943)). See also Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (rejecting
application of the Parker immunity doctrine, noting “[t]he fact that the State Bar
is a state agency for some limited purposes does not create an antitrust shield
that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members.”).
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applied to its actions.133 Special rules applied to claims that
“a nonsovereign actor controlled by active market
participants—such
as
the
Board—enjoys
Parker
immunity . . . .”134 The Court noted:
Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when the State
seeks to delegate its regulatory power to active market participants,
for established ethical standards may blend with private
anticompetitive motives in a way difficult even for market
participants to discern. Dual allegiances are not always apparent to
an actor. In consequence, active market participants cannot be
allowed to regulate their own markets free from antitrust
accountability.135

The Board, therefore, was required to demonstrate: (1)
that “the challenged restraint . . . [was] one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy”; and
(2) that “the policy . . . [was] actively supervised by the
State.”136 There was no doubt that the Dental Practice Act
prohibited the unlicensed practice of dentistry, but “its Act
[was] silent on whether that broad prohibition covers teeth
whitening.”137 Moreover, the Court held that there was no
active state supervision of the Board’s determination that
teeth whitening constituted the practice of dentistry or its
decision to enforce the policy by “issuing cease-and-desist
letters to nondentist teeth whiteners.”138

133. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1110.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1111.
136. Id. at 1110.
137. Id.
138. Id. The Court noted:
After receiving complaints from other dentists about the nondentists’
cheaper services, the Board’s dentist members—some of whom offered
whitening services—acted to expel the dentists’ competitors from the
market. In so doing the Board relied upon cease-and-desist letters
threatening criminal liability, rather than any of the powers at its
disposal that would invoke oversight by a politically accountable official.
With no active supervision by the State, North Carolina officials may
well have been unaware that the Board had decided teeth whitening

2019] CHALLENGES TO PHYSICIAN CONTROL

631

The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners
case was hotly debated and courts and commentators are
still working through the implications of the decision.139 As
noted above, medical licensure boards are dominated by
members of the medical profession.140 The Court’s decision
means that these boards must be able to demonstrate that
contested decisions are within “clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed . . . state policy” and that there was
active state supervision of the policy. At the very least,
medical licensing boards may therefore have to relinquish
some independence and power to secure the benefits of
Parker immunity.141

constitutes “the practice of dentistry” and sought to prohibit those who
competed against dentists from participating in the teeth whitening
market. Whether or not the Board exceeded its powers under North
Carolina law . . . there is no evidence here of any decision by the State to
initiate or concur with the Board’s actions against the nondentists.
Id. at 1116 (citations omitted).
139. See, e.g., Nick Robinson, The Multiple Justifications of Occupational
Licensing, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1903, 1922–26 (2018); William M. Sage & David A.
Hyman, Antitrust As a Disruptive Innovation in Health Care: Can Limiting State
Action Immunity Help Save a Trillion Dollars?, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 723 (2017);
Sandeep Vaheesan & Frank Pasquale, The Politics of Professionalism:
Reappraising Occupational Licensure and Competition Policy, 14 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 309, 321–22 (2018). As of June 2019, there were already 1047 citing
references to North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners in the Thomson
Reuters Westlaw database, including 74 cases and 180 law review articles.
Search results for 135 S. Ct. 1101 on June 22, 2019 (on file with the author).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 113–114.
141. The Court offered some guidance:
The Court has identified only a few constant requirements of active
supervision: The supervisor must review the substance of the
anticompetitive decision, not merely the procedures followed to produce
it, the supervisor must have the power to veto or modify particular
decisions to ensure they accord with state policy, and the “mere potential
for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the
State[.]” Further, the state supervisor may not itself be an active market
participant. In general, however, the adequacy of supervision otherwise
will depend on all the circumstances of a case.
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116–17 (citations omitted).
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4. New Providers and Enhanced Patient Choice
The preceding sections have marked the rise of patients
as consumers and the decline of the profession’s ability to
stifle competition through its control of medical licensure.
The final licensure-related change has been a dramatic
expansion of patient choice among different types of
providers. As this subsection will discuss, health-related
professions have seized the tool of licensure to gain
recognition and, sometimes, to expand areas of practice free
from physician control. Complementary and alternative
health
providers
have
proliferated.
Technological
developments
have
also
broadened
choices
for
patients/consumers who may secure medical advice and at
least some forms of care online or through smartphone apps.
Advances in artificial intelligence may create new
competitors for physicians in the future.
The broad definition of medical practice found in medical
licensing codes has given physicians presumptive control
over most forms of health care. New York’s scope of practice
provision is typical in its breadth: “The practice of the
profession of medicine is defined as diagnosing, treating,
operating or prescribing for any human disease, pain, injury,
deformity or physical condition.”142 Physicians have had
“exclusive” rights over all of these activities, which has
meant that non-physicians who offered a diagnosis,
recommended a treatment, or engaged in any of the other
designated acts without suitable authority risked being
charged with the unlicensed practice of medicine. Licensing
acts for other professions, such as dentistry, therefore must
include specific grants of authority to provide certain forms
of care that have been carved out from the medical practice
act.143 State licensing schemes also establish a hierarchy in
142. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6521 (McKinney 2019).
143. Richard J. Manski et al., Increasing Access to Dental and Medical Care by
Allowing Greater Flexibility in Scope of Practice, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1755,
1757 (2015) (“Medical practice acts can be thought of as umbrella acts, allowing
physicians to perform many functions that are permitted under other practice
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which physicians directly control the provision of certain
forms of care by other licensed professionals.144 In New York,
for example, registered professional nurses are granted a
nursing scope of practice but may only carry out “medical
regimens” as prescribed by physicians.145
The medical profession’s singular dominance has been
challenged in recent decades.146 Some important changes
acts, such as nursing, dentistry, and chiropractic. These other areas of practice
are essentially carveouts from the practice of medicine.”). Consistent with this
approach, New York law gives dentists the specific authority to carry out certain
forms of care that otherwise would fall within the scope of practice for medicine:
The practice of the profession of dentistry is defined as diagnosing,
treating, operating, or prescribing for any disease, pain, injury,
deformity, or physical condition of the oral and maxillofacial area related
to restoring and maintaining dental health. The practice of dentistry
includes the prescribing and fabrication of dental prostheses and
appliances. The practice of dentistry may include performing physical
evaluations in conjunction with the provision of dental treatment.
EDUC. § 6601.
144. See generally Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap between Can and May
in Health-Care Providers’ Scopes of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 YALE
J. ON REG. 301 (2002).
145. New York’s scope of practice law for registered nurses provides:
The practice of the profession of nursing as a registered professional
nurse is defined as diagnosing and treating human responses to actual
or potential health problems through such services as casefinding,
health teaching, health counseling, and provision of care supportive to
or restorative of life and well-being, and executing medical regimens
prescribed by a licensed physician, dentist or other licensed health care
provider legally authorized under this title and in accordance with the
commissioner’s regulations. A nursing regimen shall be consistent with
and shall not vary any existing medical regimen.
EDUC. § 6902(1). In contrast, licensed practical nurses may only carry out tasks
under the supervision of registered professional nurses or certain other licensed
professionals. Id. § 6902(2).
146. See, e.g., Miller v. Med. Ass’n of Ga., 423 S.E.2d 664, 665 (Ga. 1992)
(affirming a lower court judgement striking down the state’s definition of medical
practice, noting “[a]ll parties concede that the literal language of [the medical
practice provision] violates due process and equal protection in that it is so broad
that it prohibits much conduct that there is no rational basis to prohibit,
including the administering of shots by nurses, the self-injection of insulin by a
diabetic, the drawing of blood, the piercing of ears, embalming, and the tattooing
of skin, to name a few.”). See generally Christopher Ogolla, Litigating Hypocrisy:
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have been driven by enhanced education and training
programs for existing health professions.147 Nursing has
moved from hospital-based training programs to universitybased schools and graduate programs for advanced
practitioners.148 The rules governing these advanced nurse
practitioners are now in flux. In New York, and elsewhere,
nurse practitioners have been given the authority to practice
“in collaboration with a licensed physician” and to prescribe
“drugs, devices and immunizing agents . . . in accordance
with the practice agreement and practice protocols[.]”149
Other states, such as Arizona, provide for even greater scope
of independent practice, explicitly permitting nurse
practitioners to “[m]ak[e] independent decisions in solving
complex patient care problems” and to “[d]iagnos[e],
perform[] diagnostic and therapeutic procedures and
prescrib[e], administer[] and dispens[e] therapeutic
measures, including legend drugs, medical devices and
controlled substances” within certain constraints.150 Similar
debates have emerged about expanding the scope of practice

Turf Wars Between Health Care Professionals Regarding Diagnosis, Evaluation
and Treatment, 50 U. TOL. L. REV. 67 (2018) (giving an overview of the
interprofessional challenges related to the scope of “diagnosis,” “evaluation,” and
“treatment.”); Catherine Dower et al., It Is Time to Restructure Health Professions
Scope-Of-Practice Regulations to Remove Barriers to Care, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1971
(2013).
147. Safriet, supra note 144, at 305.
148. Cf. Frank J. Cavico & Nancy M. Cavico, The Nursing Profession in the
1990’s: Negligence and Malpractice Liability, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 557 (1995)
(providing a general discussion of varying levels of education, knowledge, and
skills).
149. EDUC. § 6902(3) (effective until June 30, 2021; a similar provision comes
into effect on that date). See also, Ashley Z. Ritter et al., A Policy Analysis of
Legally Required Supervision of Nurse Practitioners and Other Health
Professionals, 66 NURSING OUTLOOK 551, 553, 555 (2018).
150. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1601(22)(d) (2019). See also Sara Markowitz et
al., Competitive Effects of Scope of Practice Restrictions: Public Health or Public
Harm?, 55 J. HEALTH ECON. 201, 216–17 (2017) (indicating that varying levels of
scope of practice restrictions for certified nurse midwives were not associated in
differences in health outcomes; however, jurisdictions with fewer practice
restrictions had lower rates of induced labor and Cesarean sections).
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for other highly educated and trained health professionals.151
Patient/consumer choice has also been dramatically
affected by the expansion of alternative forms of health care,
often called “complementary and alternative medicine”
(CAM).152 Despite limited evidence regarding efficacy, 153
about one-third of adults reported using complementary
health approaches in 2012. 154 There were almost twice as
many visits to CAM providers as there were to primary care
physicians in 2005.155 Some forms of alternative and
complementary medical practice, such as chiropractic,
naturopathy, and massage therapy have sought and gained
professional status through licensure or certification. 156

151. See, e.g., Alex J. Adams & Krystalyn K. Weaver, The Continuum of
Pharmacist Prescriptive Authority, 50 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 778 (2016)
(reviewing state approaches to prescriptive authority for pharmacists.); Jean Yi
Jinn Liu, A Prescription for the Future of Illinois’ Psychologists, 23 ANNALS
HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 1, 1–2 (2013) (reviewing debate and legislation
regarding prescriptive authority for psychologists).
152. “Complementary” health care is a “non-mainstream practice [that] is used
together with conventional medicine[.]” “Alternative” health care is “a nonmainstream practice [that] is used in place of conventional medicine[.]”
Complementary, Alternative, or Integrative Health: What’s In a Name?, NAT’L
CTR. FOR COMPLEMENTARY & INTEGRATIVE HEALTH, https://nccih.nih.gov
/health/integrative-health (last visited Feb. 16, 2019) (emphasis omitted)
[hereinafter Complementary, Alternative, or Integrative Health].
153. See, e.g., Kevin Smith et al., Editorial, ‘Complementary & Alternative
Medicine’ (CAM): Ethical and Policy Issues, 30 BIOETHICS 60, 60 (2016) (“[T]he
plausibility and evidence base of many CAM treatments is very limited[.]”);
Yasamin Veziari et al., Barriers to the Conduct and Application of Research in
Complementary and Alternative Medicine: A Systematic Review, 17 BMC
COMPLEMENTARY & ALTERNATIVE MED. 166, (2017) (analyzing barriers to CAM
research).
154. Complementary, Alternative, or Integrative Health, supra note 152 (citing
a 2012 National Health Interview Survey with responses indicating that “more
than 30 percent of adults and about 12 percent of children[ ]use health care
approaches that are not typically part of conventional medical care or that may
have origins outside of usual Western practice.”).
155. Sheryl R. Groden et al., Use of Complementary and Alternative Medicine
among Older Adults: Differences Between Baby Boomers and Pre-Boomers, 25 AM.
J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 1393, 1394 (2017).
156. See, e.g., Mabel Chang, The Chiropractic Scope of Practice in the United
States: A Cross-Sectional Study, 37 J. MANIPULATIVE & PHYSIOLOGICAL
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Other forms of CAM, such as meditation and yoga, remain
outside the health care licensing system.157 CAM
expenditures were estimated to be nine billion in 2007
dollars; most CAM is an “out of pocket” expense for patients,
though licensed professions may be covered by some health
plans.158
Finally, technology has altered the market for health
care services in several ways. Advances in imaging, high
speed data connections, and other technological
developments mean that patients may now receive care
through online platforms, x-rays may be read by remote
practitioners, and cybersurgery equipment may allow
surgeons to operate on patients in other jurisdictions. The
numerous legal and economic impediments to these
advances found in licensure, payment, and liability rules, are
being addressed on a state-by-state basis, often through
approaches that retain significant limits on the provision of
care by out-of-state providers.159 However, the New
THERAPEUTICS 363 (2014); Patricia M. Herman & Ian D. Coulter, Mapping the
Health Care Policy Landscape for Complementary and Alternative Medicine
Professions Using Expert Panels and Literature Analysis, 39 J. MANIPULATIVE &
PHYSIOLOGICAL THERAPEUTICS 500, 502–03 (2016) (exploring state approaches to
licensure/certification for acupuncture, chiropractic, naturopathic medicine, and
massage therapy).
157. See Groden et al., supra note 155, at 1400.
158. Matthew A. Davis et al., US Spending on Complementary and Alternative
Medicine During 2002–08 Plateaued, Suggesting Role in Reformed Health
System, 32 HEALTH AFF. 45, 49 (2013).
159. A detailed discussion of the legal issues raised by telemedicine in the
United States is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Archie A.
Alexander III, American Diagnostic Radiology Moves Offshore: Is this Field
Riding the “Internet Wave” into a Regulatory Abyss?, 20 J. L. & HEALTH 199, 241–
50 (2007); Coryell L. Barlow & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., Teleradiology: The Perks,
Pitfalls and Patients Who Ultimately Pay, 41 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L. J. 1,
8–11 (2015); Michael W. King, Telemedicine: Game Changer or Costly Gimmick?,
95 DENV. L. REV. 289 (2018); Thomas R. McLean, Cybersurgery—An Argument
for Enterprise Liability, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 167 (2002). See also Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, Regulation and Liability Arising from Telemedicine, 23 A.L.R.7th
Art. 5 (2017). Some health systems are moving aggressively to foster online access
to health care. See Gareth Iacobucci, NHS Long Term Plan: All Patients to Have
Access to Online GP Consultations by 2023–24, 364 BMJ 187 (2019) (discussing
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Interstate Medical Licensure Compact is designed, in part,
to facilitate telemedicine services by creating an “expedited
pathway to licensure for qualified physicians who wish to
practice in multiple states.”160 The impact of technological
advances can be seen in personalized health information
available through smartphone apps and wearable health
devices.161 Artificial intelligence research is also moving into
potential applications related to diagnosis and the
development of treatment options—areas long within the
core domain of medical practice.162 Slowly but surely, these
technological advances are expanding patient choice by
broadening the range of potential providers of medical care.
IV. THE NEXT STAGE OF TEMPERING POWER: PROFESSIONAL
DUTIES TO PATIENTS OR COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CONSUMERS?
A. Overview
As Parts II and III of this Article demonstrate, law
played an important role in establishing and in moderating
the power of physicians in relation to patients and other
groups in the health care system. The Article describes a
health care system that is increasingly complex in terms of
the English National Health Service’s online initiative).
160. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND Actions
6–7, 33, 97 (2018), https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/publications/usmedical-regulatory-trends-actions.pdf.
161. See, e.g., Fazal Khan, The “Uberization” of Healthcare: The Forthcoming
Legal Storm over Mobile Technology’s Impact on the Medical Profession, 26
HEALTH MATRIX 123, 138–141 (2016); Nicholas P. Terry, Appification, AI, and
Healthcare’s New Iron Triangle, 20 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 117, 129–31
(2018).
162. See generally Jessica S. Allain, From Jeopardy! To Jaundice: The Medical
Liability Implications of Dr. Watson and Other Artificial Intelligence Systems, 73
LA. L. REV. 1049 (2013); Lawrence A. Lynn, Artificial Intelligence Systems for
Complex Decision-Making in Acute Care Medicine: A Review, PATIENT SAFETY
SURGERY 6, (2019), https://doi.org/10.1186/s13037-019-0188-2; Nariman
Noorbakhsh-Sabet et al., Artificial Intelligence Transforms the Future of
Healthcare, 132 AM. J. MED. 795 (2019).
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the types of participants, the range of economic incentives,
and the sources of regulation. Moreover, the growing power
of payers and integrated health care delivery systems has
left both patients and physicians vulnerable. Although
predictions are always pregnant with failure, it is an
important moment to ask about whether and how law will
influence the relative power of physicians and patients
moving forward.
Part IV of this Article takes on this challenge by focusing
on one contested aspect of the physician-patient relationship:
whether the physician’s oft-mentioned duty of loyalty should
be more vigorously enforced through the application of
fiduciary law to the physician-patient relationship. I will
consider the status of efforts to establish a physician’s
fiduciary duty to serve patients’ interests through the views
of ethicists, legal scholars and the courts. The section will
conclude with a brief discussion of future options.
B. The Duty of Loyalty?
Physicians have complicated and potentially conflicting
roles. As patients within treatment relationships, we expect
that our physicians will offer knowledge, skill and expertise
to identify and address health challenges. We may be
vulnerable due to lack of knowledge, the anxieties and
physical distress of illness, or the sensitive nature of our
condition. Research suggests that trust is an important
feature of the treatment relationship.163 It is not surprising
163. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463,
470 (2002) (“Trust is the core, defining characteristic of the doctor-patient
relationship—the ‘glue’ that holds the relationship together and makes it
possible.”). See also Robert J. Blendon et al., Public Trust in Physicians—U.S.
Medicine in International Perspective, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1570, 1570–71
(2014) (noting that the U.S. “ranks near the bottom in the public’s trust in the
country’s physicians”; 58% of U.S. adults agree with the statement: “All things
considered, doctors in [your country] can be trusted.”); Allan H. Goroll, Toward
Trusting Therapeutic Relationships—In Favor of the Annual Physical, 373 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1487 (2015) (noting the importance of trust and the role of the
annual physical in creating a therapeutic relationship.); Ted J. Kaptchuk &
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that trust might allow us to disclose important information
to our physician and that it might help to create a confidence
about our prospects for healing that on its own can help to
offer relief.164 Yet, as discussed in Parts II & III, physicians
are more than healers; they are self-interested actors,
entrepreneurs, gatekeepers and stewards of our health care
system. The ethical and legal norms governing physicians
reflect these potential conflicts.165
The medical profession’s ethical guidelines have long
recognized the importance of patient trust and physician
loyalty.166 The AMA’s Principles of Medical Ethics provide
that “[a] physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard
responsibility to the patient as paramount.”167 The AMA’s
Opinions on the Patient-Physician Relationship emphasize
that “[t]he relationship between a patient and a physician is
based on trust, which gives rise to physicians’ ethical
responsibility to place patients’ welfare above the physician’s
own self-interest or obligations to others, to use sound
medical judgment on patients’ behalf, and to advocate for
their patients’ welfare.”168 Despite the clarity and strength of
Franklin G. Miller, Placebo Effects in Medicine, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 8 (2015)
(exploring placebo research, including impact of the treatment relationship on
healing and the risk that use of placebos might diminish trust.).
164. Cf. Hall, supra note 58, at 470–81.
165. Physicians could be substituted for one of the figures in a Gestalt picture.
As noted in a recent Journal of the American Medical Association article,
“[i]ndividuals in the United States are adept at holding 2 competing views about
healthcare: on the one hand, healthcare revolves around a sacred compact
between patients and clinicians and local institutions; on the other hand,
healthcare is a business that operates on (regulated) market principles.” Selena
E. Ortiz & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Editorial, Medical Marketing, Trust, and the
Patient-Physician Relationship, 321 JAMA 40, 40 (2019).
166. See infra text accompanying notes 167–169.
167. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (AM. MED. ASS’N
2016). The Preamble also establishes the primacy of the physician’s duty to his
or her patients: “The medical profession has long subscribed to a body of ethical
statements developed primarily for the benefit of the patient. As a member of this
profession, a physician must recognize responsibility to patients first and
foremost, as well as to society, to other health professionals, and to self.” Id.
168. CODE

OF

MEDICAL ETHICS Ch. 1 § 1.1 (AM. MED. ASS’N 2016),
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the AMA’s position, the organization is careful to note that
its opinions “are offered as ethics guidance for physicians and
are not intended to establish standards of clinical practice or
rules of law.”169
The AMA and others within the medical profession also
recognize the multitude of challenges created by real or
potential conflicts of interest. The AMA’s Ethics Opinions
suggest that disclosure to patients is the primary mechanism
for addressing these conflicts. Physicians are to “respect[]
patients’ right[] . . . . [t]o be advised of any conflicts of
interest their physician may have in respect to their care.”170
https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2019-01/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter1_0.pdf.
Other important medical organizations have also recognized the importance
of loyalty and trust in the relationship. For example, the Ethics Manual of the
American College of Physicians provides:
The patient-physician relationship entails special obligations for the
physician to serve the patient’s interest because of the specialized
knowledge that physicians possess, the confidential nature of the
relationship, the vulnerability brought on by illness, and the imbalance
of expertise and power between patient and physician. Physicians
publicly profess that they will use their skills for the benefit of patients,
not for other reasons, including their own benefit. Physicians must
uphold this declaration, as should their professional associations as
communities of physicians that put patient welfare first.
Lois Snyder Sulmasy & Thomas A. Bledsoe, American College of Physicians,
Ethics Manual: Seventh Edition, 170 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. S1, S3 (2019). These
general principles are also reflected in ethics positions on particular issues. See,
e.g., Lois Snyder Sulmasy & Paul S. Mueller, Ethics and the Legalization of
Physician-Assisted Suicide: An American College of Physicians Position Paper,
167 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 576, 578, app. (2017) (noting, in the Position Paper,
the impact of physician assisted suicide on trust; the appendix expands on theme:
“The physician must earn the patient’s trust, preserve his or her confidentiality,
and act as a fiduciary.”).
169. See, e.g., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS Ch. 1 (introductory statement).
170. Id. § 1.1.3 (“Patient Rights”). The AMA Opinions also address conflicts of
interest arising in specific settings. Id. § 1.2.6 (“Work-Related & Independent
Medical Examinations”); § 1.2.11 (“Ethically Sound Innovation in Medical
Practice”); § 11.2.2 (“Conflicts of Interest in Patient Care[,]” which provides
“[u]nder no circumstances may physicians place their own financial interests
above the welfare of their patients.”) The AMA guidance occasionally
incorporates an awareness of the potential for legal obligations. Id. § 1.2.12
(“Ethical Practice in Telemedicine[,]” which provides: “All physicians who
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Beyond the AMA’s guidance, there is a substantial body of
medical literature on conflicts of interest generally and in
specific areas, such as in research and the financial aspects
of health care.171
From a legal perspective, notions of trust and loyalty are
most often associated with the requirements of fiduciary
law.172 Fiduciary principles are applied to certain
relationships in which one party exercises significant control
over a person, object, or other important matter, and the
other party is vulnerable or the circumstances otherwise
suggest the potential for abuse.173 Fiduciary law can be the
source of specific legal duties, such as the duty of loyalty, or
can be referenced by courts as a justification for imposing
more stringent or exacting contractual or tort duties than
would otherwise apply to the parties.174 Although the precise
requirements of fiduciary law can vary from one relationship

participate in telehealth/telemedicine have an ethical responsibility to uphold
fundamental fiduciary obligations by disclosing any financial or other interests
the physician has in the telehealth/telemedicine application or service and taking
steps to manage or eliminate conflicts of interests.”) (emphasis added).
171. For some particularly useful recent collections of articles on this topic, see
Conflict of Interest Theme Issue, 317 JAMA 1717 (2017); Lisa Rosenbaum,
Reconnecting the Dots—Reinterpreting Industry-Physician Relations, 372 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1860 (2015); Lisa Rosenbaum, Understanding Bias—The Case for
Careful Study, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1959 (2015); Lisa Rosenbaum, Beyond
Moral Outrage—Weighing the Trade-Offs of COI Regulation, 372 New Eng. J.
Med. 2064 (2015); Conflicts of Interest in the Practice of Medicine, 40 J. L. MED.
& ETHICS 436, 441–522 (2012).
172. See generally Mark A. Hall, Fiduciary Principles in Health Care, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds.) (forthcoming
2019).
173. HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 122. The person in the
position of power is called “the fiduciary” and the vulnerable party is called the
“entrustor.” See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV.
1209, 1210 (1995).
174. See HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 122. “Confidential
relationships” are closely related to but distinct from fiduciary relationships,
“[t]he law does not assume that a position of trust exists in a confidential relation
as quickly as it does in a fiduciary one, but where such trust exists, the duties are
essentially the same.” Id. at n.2.
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to another,175 where it is deemed to apply, the fiduciary duty
of loyalty mirrors the ethics-based duties established in the
AMA’s Code: a fiduciary has a legal duty of loyalty to the
other party that requires placing the interests of that party
above his or her own.176
Courts have recognized the potential “match” between
the attributes of the physician-patient treatment
relationship and the factors giving rise to fiduciary
relationships. There are many state court decisions affirming
that the physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one.177
175. Id. at 122. See also Hall, supra note 163, at 489–91; L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary
Relationships, 1962 Cambridge L. J. 69, 73 (establishing that a relationship that
is a fiduciary one opens the door to the application of fiduciary responsibilities
and remedies, but more is needed to determine which will be applied in the
circumstances).
176. Frankel, supra note 173, at 1210–11 (“[F]iduciaries owe entrustors both a
duty of care—to act carefully and not negligently—and a duty of loyalty—to
perform their services in the interest of their entrustors and not in conflict of
interest. In most cases fiduciaries can be relieved of these duties only if entrustors
expressly or impliedly waive these duties; in some cases the duties are nonwaivable.”).
177. See, e.g., Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics and Gynecology, P.C., 175 A.3d
1, 7 (Conn. 2018) (noting that the appeals court had recognized “the fiduciary
nature of the physician-patient relationship, which is based on trust and
confidence”); Brandt v. Medical Defense Associates, 856 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo.
1993) (en banc) (“[T]he courts of Missouri have recognized that ‘[a] physician
occupies a position of trust and confidence as regards his patient—a fiduciary
position’” (quoting Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961));
Chanko v. Am. Broad. Cos., 49 N.E.3d 1171, 1177 (N.Y. 2016) (considering
whether “the confidentiality inherent in the fiduciary physician-patient
relationship” has been breached.); King v. Bryant, 795 S.E.2d 340, 350 (N.C.
2017) (holding that a fiduciary relationship existed between a physician and
patient at the time the patient was asked to sign an arbitration agreement and
lack of “full disclosure of the nature and import of the arbitration agreement”
constituted a violation of that fiduciary duty.); Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med.
Ctr. of Akron, 142 Ohio St. 3d 257, 2015-Ohio-229, 29 N.E.3d 921, at ¶ 25 (“The
physician-patient relationship arises from an express or implied contract
between the physician and patient and imposes on the physician a fiduciary duty
to exercise good faith.”); Parris v. Limes, 2012 OK 18, n. 3, 277 P.3d 1259, 1265
n.3 (“[T]he relationship between a physician and patient is a fiduciary and
confidential relationship.”); Youngs v. Peacehealth, 316 P.3d 1035, 1038 (Wash.
2014) (en banc) (stating that the physician patient relationship is a fiduciary one;
case involves ex parte contacts.); State ex rel. Kitzmiller v. Henning, 437 S.E.2d
452, 454 (W. Va. 1993) (“Information is entrusted to the doctor in the expectation
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In some jurisdictions, the relationship is said to have
fiduciary “characteristics” or to be a “confidential”
relationship.178 In many cases, the recitations are superficial
rather than substantive.179
In two landmark decisions, the special characteristics of
the physician-patient relationship led courts to enhance
physicians’ disclosure obligations to patients. In Canterbury
v. Spence, the court characterized the patient’s “reliance on
the physician” as “a trust of the kind which traditionally”
involves special obligations.180 The court’s creation of a
patient-centered theory of informed consent—one in which
the duty to disclose would be measured by the reasonable
patient’s needs rather than the standards of the profession—
was based in part on fiduciary principles. 181
In the second case, Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, the California Supreme Court considered a
number of claims brought by a patient, John Moore, against
various individual and institutional defendants, including
of confidentiality and the doctor has a fiduciary obligation in that regard”; case
involved ex parte contacts.).
178. In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal.
1990), the court held that “a physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose all
information material to the patient’s decision[,]” but also noted that “in some
respects the term ‘fiduciary’ is too broad. In this context the term ‘fiduciary’
signifies only that a physician must disclose all facts material to the patient’s
decision. . . .” Id at 485 n.10. See also Aufrichtig v. Lowell, 650 N.E.2d 401, 404
(N.Y. 1995) (noting, in slight contrast to the fiduciary reference in Chanko, 49
N.E.3d at 1177, that “[t]he physician-patient relationship thus operates and
flourishes in an atmosphere of transcendent trust and confidence and is infused
with fiduciary obligations.” (citations omitted)); Humphers v. First Interstate
Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 536 (Or. 1985) (holding that a patient may bring claim
against her physician for a “breach of confidentiality in a confidential
relationship.”).
179. See, e.g., Gables at Sterling Village Homeowners Ass’n v. CastlewoodSterling Village I, LLC, 2018 UT 04, ¶ 51, 417 P.3d 95, 109 (passing reference to
the physician-patient relationship as a fiduciary relationship); HCC Specialty
Underwriters, Inc. v. Woodbury, 289 F. Supp. 3d 303, 320 (D.N.H. 2018) (one of
many cases in which the physician-patient relationship is noted to be a fiduciary
one in a case that involves a different issue.).
180. 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 86–88.
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his physician, Dr. Golde.182 The case arose after Mr. Moore’s
treatment for hairy-cell leukemia, when he learned that the
defendants had used cells and tissues that they had
extracted from him to create and to patent a potentially
valuable cell line.183 The California Supreme Court held that
Mr. Moore could challenge Dr. Golde’s involvement as either
a breach of his “fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to
the patient’s consent” or as a breach of his duty to obtain
informed consent.184 The court established a duty to disclose
that focused on the problem of conflicts of interest, holding
that “a physician must disclose personal interests unrelated
to the patient’s health, whether research or economic, that
may affect the physician’s professional judgment[.]” 185
Because the case was remanded for further proceedings, and
later settled,186 the courts did not resolve important issues,
such as the appropriate test for causation and the measure
of damages.187
Over the past few decades, through waves of consumer
empowerment and commercialization, many leading legal
182. 793 P.2d at 480–81.
183. Id. at 481–82.
184. Id. at 483.
185. Id. The court noted the problem of “potentially conflicting loyalties” in
research:
[M]edical treatment decisions are made on the basis of proportionality—
weighing the benefits to the patient against the risks to the patient. . . . A
physician who adds his own research interests to this balance may be
tempted to order a scientifically useful procedure or test that offers
marginal, or no, benefits to the patient. The possibility that an interest
extraneous to the patient’s health has affected the physician’s judgment
is something that a reasonable patient would want to know in deciding
whether to consent to a proposed course of treatment.
Id. at 484 (footnote omitted).
186. Dennis McLellan, Obituary, John Moore, 56; Sued to Share Profits from
His
Cells,
L.A.
TIMES
(Oct.
13,
2001),
available
at:
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/oct/13/local/me-56770.
187. These matters were debated in Justice Broussard’s concurring and
dissenting opinion, Moore, 793 P.2d at 500, and Justice Mosk’s dissenting
opinion, id. at 518–21.
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scholars have relied on Canterbury, Moore, and other
physicians-are-fiduciary cases to argue that fiduciary law
can and should be used to protect vulnerable patients. 188
Fiduciary principles might be used to address risks arising
within the patient-physician relationship. Scholars thus
have relied upon fiduciary theories to address conflicts of
interest arising from health care financing arrangements; 189
to guard against conflicts of interest in research;190 to require
disclosure of medical errors;191 to support claims that
physicians should be required to disclose provider-associated
risks, such as lack of experience;192 and to mandate

188. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 163; Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why Physicians are
Fiduciaries for Their Patients, 12 IND. HEALTH L.J. 1 (2015). Although this Article
focuses on recent debates, legal commentators have viewed the physician-patient
relationship in fiduciary terms for nearly ninety years. See, e.g., LLOYD PAUL
STRYKER, COURTS AND DOCTORS 9 (1932) (“The relationship of patient and
physician is to the highest possible degree a fiduciary one, involving every
element of trust and confidence.”).
189. See, e.g., Dayna Bowen Matthew, Implementing American Health Care
Reform: The Fiduciary Imperative, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 715 (2011); Maxwell J.
Mehlman, Can Law Save Medicine?, 36 J. LEGAL MED. 121, 155–57 (2015). But
see Isaac D. Buck, Furthering the Fiduciary Metaphor: The Duty of Providers to
the Payers of Medicare, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1043 (2016) (arguing that the fiduciary
concept should be expanded to include a physician duty of loyalty to Medicare as
a payer.); Jessica Mantel, A Defense of Physicians’ Gatekeeping Role: Balancing
Patients’ Needs with Society’s Interests, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 633, 636 (2015)
(suggesting that physicians’ fiduciary duties be “limited by the physician’s
competing obligations to society.”). For an article considering a different form of
financial incentive, see Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah P. Bryan, Beware Those
Bearing Gifts: Physicians’ Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57
U. KAN. L. REV. 491 (2009) (applying fiduciary principles to reduce risks to
patients arising from pharmaceutical marketing programs).
190. See, e.g., Robert Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust in Human Subjects
Research: The Challenge of Regulating Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 Emory
L.J. 327 (2003).
191. See e.g., Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A
Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient,
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167 (2009). See also Nadia N. Sawicki, Choosing Medical
Malpractice, 93 Wash. L. Rev. 891, 965 (noting that the “fiduciary nature of the
physician-patient relationship” requires that physicians make certain disclosures
to patients before seeking to rely on assumption of risk or contractual waiver to
avoid liability for care that would otherwise constitute malpractice).
192. Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from

646

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

disclosure of a physician’s conscience-based limitations on
medical practice.193 Framing the patient-physician
relationship as a fiduciary one might also reinforce efforts by
physicians to maintain the distinctive nature of their bond
with patients, even as patient-consumers choose from the
ever-widening range of potential providers noted in Part
III.194 Affirming the physician-patient relationship’s
fiduciary character could support efforts by physicians to
strengthen their ability to follow non-market ethical
principles and to protect the treatment relationship itself
from the impact of swirling market forces and pressures.195
These scholarly commentaries suggest that fiduciary law
could bolster protections for patients within an increasingly
commercialized health care environment. Fiduciary law—by

Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 340–56 (1994).
193. Nadia N. Sawicki, Mandating Disclosure of Conscience-Based Limitations
on Medical Practice, 42 AM. J. L. & MED. 85, 107–110 (2016). See also Michelle
Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fiduciary Role
in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451 (2000) (arguing that cases
currently understood as reflecting “maternal-fetal conflicts” should be reframed
as potential violations of a physician’s fiduciary duty to his or her pregnant
patient.).
194. Although many courts have not considered the question, some have
specifically rejected the application of fiduciary principles to other types of health
care providers. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 486
(Cal. 1990) (“The Regents, Quan, Genetics Institute, and Sandoz are not
physicians. In contrast to Golde, none of these defendants stood in a fiduciary
relationship with Moore or had the duty to obtain Moore’s informed consent to
medical procedures.”); HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 6, at 121–23.
But see Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 293 P.2d 816, 820 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (noting
the fiduciary character of hospital-patient relationship); Di Teresi v. Stamford
Health Sys., Inc., 63 A.3d 1011, 1023–26 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (noting the
possibility that a hospital could have a fiduciary relationship with its patients in
some circumstances.); Lee v. Williams, 2018 UT App 54, 420 P.3d 88, 103 n.7
(noting that fiduciary duty of confidentiality could be extended to nurses.). See
also Barry R. Furrow, Patient Safety and the Fiduciary Hospital: Sharpening
Judicial Remedies, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 439 (2009) (exploring the potential
application of fiduciary principles to health care institutions.).
195. Cf. Mehlman, supra note 189, at 154 (noting the possibility of permitting
physicians to bring tortious interference with fiduciary duty claims against
employers or health insurers that have attempted to induce the physicians to
breach their duties of loyalty to their patients).
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recognizing patient vulnerability—could be a source of
patient empowerment. In addition, fiduciary analyses that
recognize and rely upon ethical pronouncements about
physicians’ duties to protect vulnerable patients, to foster
trust, and to avoid divided loyalties, help to make those
otherwise precatory statements “real,” that is, something
that patients could actually rely upon. Yet, a brief review of
the caselaw with these ideas in mind reveals that courts have
not, by and large, accepted this ambitious vision of the role
of fiduciary principles in health law.
First, many of the academic commentaries noted above
rely on a small number of cases, typically involving direct
financial or research conflicts of interest.196 Second, the
soaring language noting the special character of the
physician-patient relationship found in some cases, such as
those involving confidentiality or informed consent, may be
narrowed considerably in other contexts. For example, a
number of courts have rejected fiduciary claims brought to
address physicians’ failure to provide information relating to
the patient’s financial interests.197 Third, courts sometimes

196. E.g. id. at 144 (“The most telling indication that law has dropped the ball,
however, is that despite the types of disloyal physician behavior . . . [described in
the article] there are only four reported cases in which patients sued physicians
for breach of fiduciary duty, and in none of them were the physicians actually
found liable.”).
An analysis of cases citing Moore v. Regents of the University of California
also demonstrates the disparity between the level of discussion and impact. As of
February 12, 2019, the case had 6,212 citing references on Thomson Reuters
Westlaw. Of these, 1,348 were secondary sources and 694 were cases. Only 9 of
the cases involved the highest “depth of treatment” with another 33 listed at a
moderate level. (Westlaw search conducted re: Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), on June 22, 2019).
197. As one example, in Arato v. Avedon, the widow and children of Miklos
Arato brought a claim against his physicians, arguing among other things that
they violated their fiduciary obligations by failing to disclose his “statistical life
expectancy.” The court noted:
[Plaintiffs argue] . . . “As fiduciaries it was the duty of defendants
[physicians] to make a full and fair disclosure to plaintiff of all facts
which materially affected his rights and interests.” Plaintiffs contend
that since Mr. Arato’s contracting and real estate affairs would suffer if
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view fiduciary claims as unwelcome efforts to avoid state tort
and malpractice reforms designed to limit claims and
damages.198 These courts find that the fiduciary claims are
“duplicative”199 or are subsumed within state malpractice
law.200 Fourth, fiduciary duty claims raise difficult questions
about whether a physician’s disclosure of a conflict of interest
really cures the harm to patients201 as well as challenges
he failed to make timely changes in estate planning in contemplation of
imminent death, and since these matters are among “his rights and
interests,” his physicians were under a legal duty to disclose all material
facts that might affect them, including statistical life expectancy
information. We reject the claim as one founded on a premise that is not
recognized in California. . . . The short answer to plaintiffs’ claim is our
statement in Moore that a “physician is not the patient’s financial
adviser.”
858 P.2d 598, 608 (Cal. 1993) (citations omitted). See also Thomas v. Archer, 384
P.3d 791, 796–97 (Alaska 2016) (finding that a physician’s alleged promise to
secure preauthorization fell outside fiduciary duty.); Jarrell v. Kaul, 123 A.3d
1022, 1024 (N.J. 2015) (holding that a physician has no duty to disclose lack of
malpractice insurance despite a rule requiring physicians to carry coverage.).
198. See Mehlman, supra note 189, at 148–49.
199. See e.g., Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 502 (Ill. 2000) (refusing to
recognize a breach of fiduciary duty claim arising from a physician’s failure to
reveal financial incentives that might have affected a referral for an angiogram;
court holds that the essence of a fiduciary claim would duplicate malpractice
action); Freely v. Donnenfeld, 54 N.Y.S.3d 63, 65 (App. Div. 2017) (holding that
“the proposed cause of action alleging breach of fiduciary duty was duplicative of
the medical malpractice cause of action.”).
200. Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc., 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 82, 121 (Ct. App. 2017)
(finding that fiduciary duty claims were equivalent to a claim for lack of informed
consent, a professional negligence claim subject to damage caps.); Johnson v.
Jones, 759 S.E.2d 252, 254–55 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (recognizing that a specific
claim for breach of fiduciary duty amounted to a claim of professional malpractice
that was subject to medical malpractice statute of repose.). But see Hales v.
Timberline Knolls, LLC, No. 15 C 2622, 2017 WL 25174, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3,
2017) (in a case involving failure to return phone calls, finding a fiduciary duty
claim did not require an expert report because it was distinct from a medical
malpractice case).
201. There are a number of concerns about disclosure, including questions
about whether patients understand the disclosure. See Christian P. DiPaola et
al., Surgeon-Industry Conflict of Interest: Survey of North Americans’ Opinions
Regarding Surgeons Consulting with Industry, 14 SPINE J. 584, 588 (2014)
(“Approximately 80% of survey respondents felt surgeon involvement in
consulting with industry would either be beneficial or not affect the quality of
their health care and is an ethical practice.”). An additional concern is that
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relating to the development of appropriate remedies.202
Part IV began with a promise to explore whether the
special characteristics of the physician-patient relationship
that are so often mentioned as the basis for self-regulation
and physician control of health care—such as the need to
foster patient trust and the physician’s duty of loyalty—
should be more vigorously enforced through the application
of fiduciary law to the physician-patient relationship. A
review of ethical guidelines, court decisions, and
commentaries indicates that academic enthusiasm has not
been matched by the courts, and there are reasons to doubt
that courts will adopt enhanced fiduciary protections for
patients in the future. There are several possible responses
to these observations.

patients might dismiss conflicts of interest because of their vulnerability and a
desire to maintain a strong relationship with their physicians. For a particularly
strong critique of disclosure, see BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 98
(critiquing the use of mandated disclosure to protect autonomy in a number of
settings, including informed consent). But see Roy Spece et al., An Empirical
Method for Materiality: Would Conflict of Interest Disclosures Change Patient
Decisions?, 40 AM. J. L. & MED. 253, 270 (reporting results of an empirical study
involving mock patients; finding that “[d]isclosure and enhanced disclosure
significantly and substantially increased the probability that the mock patient
would reject the conflicted physician’s recommendations.”).
202. One concern is that it may be difficult for the patient to demonstrate that
the physician’s breach of loyalty caused financial harm. Justice Mosk noted the
problem in his dissent in Moore v. Regents of the University of California:
[Another] reason why the nondisclosure cause of action is inadequate for
the task that the majority assign to it is that it fails to solve half the
problem before us: it gives the patient only the right to refuse consent,
i.e., the right to prohibit the commercialization of his tissue; it does not
give him the right to grant consent to that commercialization on the
condition that he share in its proceeds. “Even though good reasons exist
to support informed consent with tissue commercialization, a disclosure
requirement is only the first step toward full recognition of a patient’s
right to participate fully. Informed consent to commercialization, absent
a right to share in the profits from such commercial development, would
only give patients a veto over their own exploitation . . . .”
793 P.2d 479, 520 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). See also
Caroline Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, 42 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 557, 559 (2009) (arguing a statutory tort is necessary to provide remedy
for, e.g., breaches of fiduciary duty causing non-monetary harm).
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From one perspective, the physician’s duty of loyalty has
been widely adopted by professional organizations and
within ethical standards. This ethical commitment could be
celebrated on its own merits. Or, advocates might continue
to work toward legal protections for still-vulnerable patients.
Physicians who remain interested in preserving a portion of
the health care marketplace that prioritizes the treatment
relationship could be encouraged to work with professional
organizations and licensing authorities to strengthen
fiduciary ideals and to develop additional enforceable
standards governing particular areas of concern, e.g., with
respect to financial conflicts of interest. Patient advocates
could join with physicians to argue for the retention of
prohibitions on the corporate practice of medicine and for
prohibitions of some forms of financial influence inconsistent
with physicians’ loyalty to their patients. If these activities
seem hopelessly unrealistic and naïve, then perhaps there is
one more alternative to consider. Given the weak to nonexistent application of fiduciary law to the physician-patient
relationship, is it time to encourage patients not to trust their
physicians?
V. CONCLUSION
Professor John Braithwaite’s Mitchell Lecture,
Tempered Power, Variegated Capitalism, Law & Society, is
an inspiring example of his long-standing commitment to
understanding the relationship of law and power within
complex systems. This Article has taken up his challenge by
exploring the role of law in establishing, and then in
dismantling, the power of physicians in our health care
system by focusing in particular on the physician-patient
relationship.
As described in Part II, law played an important role in
establishing the sovereignty of physicians beginning in the
late 1800s. The medical profession used licensure and selfregulation to establish its identity and its primacy in the
health care system. The corporate practice of medicine
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doctrine was particularly helpful in ensuring that the
physician-patient relationship would remain free from
corporate control. The custom-based approach to medical
malpractice law also protected both individual physicians
and the profession as a whole from external review.
The profession’s dominance over patients and the health
care system began to unravel in the 1960s. Some of these
changes were driven by the economics of health care and the
arrival of public and private health insurers bent on
controlling costs. Part III of this Article analyzed a series of
law-based assaults on physician power and control. The first
major change came through court decisions designed to
rebalance power in the physician-patient relationship
through the informed consent doctrine. Thereafter,
licensure-based challenges to physician dominance
facilitated the transition from empowered patients to
patient-consumers exercising choice in a more diverse health
care marketplace.
In Part IV, I turned to the question of whether the
physician-patient
relationship
retained
special
characteristics, such as the physician’s duty of loyalty, that
could and perhaps should be further recognized through
fiduciary law. Despite the profession’s longstanding
statements about the special character of the physician’s
duties of loyalty to their patients, physicians might be
expected to resist this potential expansion of liability.
However, strengthening legal recognition of a physician’s
fiduciary duties to his or her patients could bolster
physicians’ efforts to insulate the profession from some types
of market-based forces. From this perspective, I suggest that
patients and physicians would both be better off if loyalty
were more than an aspirational goal. Of course, if the
physician’s ethical duty of loyalty is not fully recognized in
law, then perhaps it should no longer be considered to be a
defining feature of the physician-patient relationship.
Without an enforceable duty of loyalty, the physician-patient
relationship may yet move more fully and firmly into an
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ordinary commercial sphere, one among many in the health
care system.

